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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
At first glance, the roles of victim and perpetrator exist in op-
position to one another. Under this assumption, there is a clear
distinction between the “good” victim’s passive conduct and the “bad”
perpetrator’s active conduct—which, in turn, makes the assignment
of blame and criminal liability fairly straightforward. Upon a closer
look, however, it becomes apparent that a troubling dichotomy
between the roles of victim and perpetrator plagues victims of hu-
man trafficking.1
This false dichotomy is brought to life when trafficking victims,
themselves, engage in criminal conduct during the course of their
trafficking that in some ways relates to their own victimization but
also violates state or federal law.2 In fact, distinguishing between
varying degrees of coercion and the trafficker’s role in the criminal
conduct of his victims presents one of the most challenging problems
for law enforcement, prosecutors, and social services to address: the
“victim-perpetrator” dilemma. Victims are not immune from liability,
and in instances in which a victim’s conduct is “sufficiently harmful
1. This Comment primarily uses the term “victim” to refer to those affected by human
trafficking but will often use “survivor” interchangeably because advocates typically
prefer the term and it more accurately depicts their status. Additionally, this Comment
uses female pronouns for trafficking survivors, but also recognizes that men are heavily
exploited by human trafficking.
2. See Jeffrey H. Zeeman & Karen Stauss, Criminal Conduct of Victims: Policy Con-
siderations, 65 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 139, 140 (2017). This dichotomy presents several difficult
questions, for example: what is the proper criminal justice response when a sex trafficking
victim steals money from her john to meet her daily quota? Or when a labor trafficker
promises a foreign citizen meaningful employment in the United States and later forces
him to keep working past the expiration date of his visa? See infra Sections I.B.1–2, in
which these questions will be addressed more fully.
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to others” and “insufficiently connected to coercion,” it may be appro-
priate for prosecutors to consider charging a victim despite their
victimization.3 However, trafficking victims are uniquely situated
and suffer varying degrees of coercion that often directly contribute
to their involvement in criminal conduct.4 This Comment does not
seek to determine the line at which victims should begin to be held
liable for engaging in criminal activity;5 it does, however, propose to
protect victims to the fullest and characterize those exploited by hu-
man traffickers as victims, not criminals—at least presumptively.6
Traffickers are the root of the problem, and the focus should remain
on prosecuting them.7
Before 2010, trafficking victims were regularly prosecuted for
the prostitution-related crimes they were forced to commit during
their trafficking.8 In reaction to and with pressure from activists
and encouragement from federal Model Law, states began enacting
safe harbor statutes.9 These safe harbor statutes are state-specific
and ordinarily seek to shield trafficking victims from prosecution for
their coerced prostitution-related offenses.10 Despite these efforts,
however, victims still face unnecessary criminalization when they
are coerced into criminal conduct.11
3. See Zeeman & Stauss, supra note 2, at 144 (“While the victim-perpetrator may
be the member of society that has the biggest stake in a case at hand, law enforcement
must balance the interests of this victim against the interests of other victims, of poten-
tial future crime victims, and of the community in being safe from harmful conduct.”);
see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.200-20 (2017), https://
www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.300 [https://per
ma.cc/67V6-ZQTT] (detailing the principles of federal prosecution and factors that prose-
cutors must balance).
4. See Sabrina Balmgamwalla, Trafficking in Narratives: Conceptualizing and Re-
casting Victims, Offenders, and Rescuers in the War on Human Trafficking, 94 DENV. L.
REV. 1, 23 (2016). “The flip side of agency and consent is that victims cannot always be
considered ‘innocent’ of unlawful conduct.” Id. at 26.
5. The solution of this issue lies in the facts of each case, proper investigative
techniques, the use of prosecutorial discretion, and victim-centered social services. See
Michele Boggiani, When Is a Trafficking Victim a Trafficking Victim? Anti-Prostitution
Statutes and Victim Protection, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 915, 923 (2016).
6. See infra Section IV.A.
7. See John Cotton Richmond, The Root Cause of Human Trafficking is Traffickers,
HUM. TRAFFICKING INST. (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.traffickinginstitute.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2017/06/Root-Cause-2-pager_web.pdf [hereinafter Richmond, Root Cause]
(“Any serious effort to combat human trafficking must include striking at its root cause:
the traffickers.”).
8. Cheryl Nelson Butler, Bridge over Troubled Water: Safe Harbor Laws for Sexually
Exploited Minors, 93 N.C. L. REV 1281, 1283–84 (2015).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Section II.A. The first “safe harbor” law, which dealt with minors, was
in New York in 2007. See N.Y. SAFE HARBOR FOR EXPLOITED CHILDREN ACT LAW § 5258-C
(McKinney 2007).
11. See infra Section I.B. For example, “[i]t is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to obtain certain types of employment, education, housing, and financial assistance as
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States have sought to address the victim-perpetrator dilemma
by providing several remedies to victims, but each remedy suffers
drawbacks because it is either difficult to assert, contains stringent
eligibility requirements, or is merely reactionary—meaning that the
remedy is only offered after the victim exits the criminal justice sys-
tem as a criminal.12 For these reasons, this Comment proposes that
a victim should be provided with a presumption of coercion for any
non-violent crime committed during the course of her trafficking; a
presumption that would take effect during trial and, if not rebutted,
wrap in vacatur relief for arrests and charges related to the offense,
so that survivors may be protected on the front end, before collecting
an overwhelming criminal history.13 Because a trafficker’s coercion
transcends into every area of a victim’s life,14 this Comment also
posits that safe harbor statutes should be expanded beyond prosti-
tution-related offenses and extend to all non-violent crimes survivors
commit under the coercion of their trafficker.15 The effects of arrest,
prosecution, conviction, and detainment cripple the recovery of sur-
vivors, as they make it nearly impossible for survivors with exten-
sive criminal records to obtain work, financial loans, public housing,
education, custody of their child, or to move past trauma.16
Part I of this Comment details the trafficker’s coercive scheme
and outlines substantial problems that victims face as a result of the
enduring nature of the impact of coercion.17 Part II provides rele-
vant background information regarding the federal criminalization
of human trafficking and the emergence of safe harbor statutes.18 It
a result of the criminal record that stems from one’s status as a victim of sex trafficking.”
Samantha M. Meiers, Removing Insult from Injury: Expunging State Criminal Records
of Persons Trafficked in the Commercial Sex Trade, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 211, 217 (2015).
12. See infra Part III; see also Francisco Zornosa, Protecting Human Trafficking Victims
from Punishment and Promoting Their Rehabilitation: The Need for an Affirmative De-
fense, 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 177, 186, 190 (2016) (“Given the ineffec-
tiveness of trafficking-related vacatur statutes, legislators . . . should ask themselves
why they do not provide these victims with relief before a conviction . . . .”).
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See Danielle (“Elle”) Augustson, Protecting Human-Trafficking Victims from
Criminal Liability—A Legislative Approach, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 625, 634 (2016).
Usual methods traffickers use may include withholding documentation, exploiting or
creating strong drug and alcohol dependencies, or using debts to control victims. See
Richmond, Human Trafficking, infra note 22, at 33.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. Stephanie Richard, Victims of Human Trafficking Should Not Be Arrested for
Crimes Their Traffickers Force Them to Commit 1, 2 COAL. TO ABOLISH SLAVERY & TRAF-
FICKING (2016); see also, e.g., People v. C.C., No. 51621(U), slip op. at 3 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.
Sept. 19, 2014) (noting the victim was prevented from obtaining a cosmetology license
as a result of her criminal record and its “negative impact on her opportunity to rebuild
her life”).
17. See infra Part I.
18. See infra Part II.
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will discuss the distinction between granting prosecutorial immu-
nity and offering diversion programs and will briefly compare the
safe harbor laws of Minnesota, Tennessee, and New York on their
treatment of trafficking survivors. Part III describes the inadequacies
of the existing remedies for human trafficking victims, highlighting
the need for additional safeguards for victims.19 Finally, Part IV ar-
gues that states should expand safe harbor provisions to create a
rebuttable presumption that victims’ non-violent crimes committed
during trafficking are a direct result of the victimization and there-
fore not susceptible to prosecution.20 In doing so, states will affirm
the victimhood of survivors and relieve them from the trauma
associated with becoming a criminal defendant.21
I. THE HUMAN TRAFFICKER’S COERCIVE SCHEME
It is estimated that there are 24.9 million human trafficking
victims in the world today,22 and that human trafficking generates
more than $150 billion in criminal proceeds each year.23 In 2017
alone, there were 783 active federal human trafficking cases in the
United States, including both criminal and civil cases.24 The United
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See Ryan A. Hancock, The Double Bind: Obstacles to Employment and Resources
for Survivors of the Criminal Justice System, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 515, 517–20
(2012). Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the criminal justice system is
less serious, “the collateral consequences of the conviction will magnify the punishment
for these individuals’ lifetimes, decreasing access to employment, housing, and social
services.” Id. at 519.
22. There are various global estimates of the number of trafficking victims, including
estimates of “20.9 million, 27 million, 28.4 million, and 35.8 million,” and each receive some
level of criticism for their methodology. See John Cotton Richmond, Human Trafficking:
Understanding the Law and Deconstructing Myths, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 14 (2015)
[hereinafter Richmond, Human Trafficking] (“[T]he reality that human trafficking is a
hidden crime, and the difficulty of victims seeking out law enforcement make developing
an accurate estimate a thorny endeavor.”). Additionally, the International Labour Orga-
nization estimates that “[i]n the past five years, 89 million people experienced some form
of modern slavery for periods of time ranging from a few days to the whole five years.”
See 8.7 ALLIANCE, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced
Marriage, INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@
dcomm/documents/publication /wcms_575479.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2019) [hereinafter
Forced Labour].
23. Elizabeth G. Wright, Follow the Money: Financial Crimes and Forfeiture in Human
Trafficking Prosecutions, 65 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 79, 79 (2017); Human Trafficking by the
Numbers, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Jan. 7, 2017), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/hu
man-trafficking-numbers [https://perma.cc/8LKT-5DLT]; see also Forced Labour, supra
note 22, at 34.
24. Kyleigh E. Feehs & John Cotton Richmond, 2017 Federal Human Trafficking
Report, HUM. TRAFFICKING INST., 10 (2018), https://www.traffickingmatters.com/wp
-content/uploads/2018/05/2017-Federal-Human-Trafficking-Report-WEB-Low-Res.pdf.
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Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ranked human trafficking “among
the top three most lucrative criminal businesses, after drug trafficking
and counterfeiting.”25 Human trafficking is a lucrative, nearly hidden
business that benefits from public misconceptions of what it is, how it
exploits the vulnerable, and when its victims should be criminalized.26
To understand the need for expanded safe harbor legislation,
the powerful grip and extent of a trafficker’s coercion must first be
understood. This Section outlines the standard recruitment patterns
traffickers employ, their psychological manipulation and exploit-
ative schemes, and the hierarchy of victimhood.27 Human trafficking
is not a “naturally occurring phenomenon”; behind each case, a traf-
ficker makes a calculated and “wil[l]ful decision to profit,” “schem-
ing to exploit the vulnerable and conceal the crime.”28 As is often the
case, the impact of this exploitation can transcend trafficking and
spill into the rest of a victim’s path to recovery.29
A. The Recruitment and Exploitation of Victims by Their Trafficker
Unlike other violent crimes or civil rights abuses, human traf-
ficking is always motivated by money.30 Not all human traffickers use
the same business model to satisfy their desire for profit and many
implement various means of fraud, force, and coercion.31 In addition
The Bureau of Justice Statistics found that in the 2015 fiscal year, a total of 1,923
criminal human trafficking cases were referred to U.S. attorneys, which is a 41% in-
crease from those referred in 2011. Mark Motivans & Howard N. Snyder, Federal Prosecu-
tion of Human-Trafficking Cases, 2015, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1, 1 (2018), https:// www.bjs
.gov/content/pub/pdf/fphtc15.pdf.
25. Wright, supra note 23, at 79; see UNODC, New UNODC Campaign Highlights
Transnational Organized Crime as a US $870 Billion a Year Business (July 16, 2012),
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/July/new-unodc-campaign-highlights
-transnational-organized-crime-as-an-us-870-billion-a-year-business.html [https://perma
.cc/N4XH-8LH5].
26. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 2, 41 (outlining several myths
about human trafficking that “prevent individuals from identifying victims in need of
help” and noting that “the reality of bringing justice to traffickers and their victims is
clouded by troublesome myths and practical challenges”).
27. See infra Sections I.A.1–2. In its discussion regarding the coercive scheme of
human trafficking, this Comment primarily focuses on sexual exploitation human
trafficking cases, while acknowledging that similar types of equally powerful coercion
exists in labor trafficking cases.
28. See Richmond, Root Cause, supra note 7, at 1–2.
29. See Heather J. Clawson et al., Treating the Hidden Wounds: Trauma Treatment
& Mental Health Recovery for Victims of Human Trafficking, ISSUE BRIEF, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. ASSISTANT SEC’Y PLAN. & EVALUATION 1, 1 (2008).
30. See Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 28 (“At its core, human
trafficking is an economically motivated crime. It involves someone exploiting his or her
power to generate and illicit economic gain by violating a victim’s human rights.”).
31. Id. Human trafficking is a criminal business that seeks to increase profits and
take advantage of corruption, while reducing any associated costs or risk. Alexis
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to sex trafficking—which may be family-directed, establishment-
based, or gang-directed32—forced labor business models also vary
drastically, can occur in any industry,33 and superficially employ
“voluntary” workers.34
One commonality among trafficking schemes, however, is that
traffickers routinely prey on the vulnerable.35 Sex traffickers, for
instance, frequently target “minors with low self-worth, prior sexual
experience, and at-risk youths” because they are easier to manipu-
late and there is less legal risk involved.36 All minors are especially
susceptible to sexual exploitation,37 and once trapped, it is common
Aronowitz et. al., Analysing the Business Model of Trafficking in Human Beings to Better
Prevent the Crime, UN GLOBAL INITIATIVE FIGHT HUM. TRAFFICKING, 55–57 (2010),
https://www.osce.org/cthb/69028?download=true.
Unlike other commodities such as drugs or stolen goods, trafficked persons
can be used over and over again; they can be rented out, or sold and resold.
They are indebted and forced to repay sums of money far above the actual
cost of their transportation, employment and housing costs. They may be ex-
ploited for years and even victims who have been rescued and repatriated
can be easily re-trafficked.
Id. at 55.
32. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 31 (“It is important to understand
that traffickers will shift their business models over time to avoid detection. Therefore,
victim advocates and investigators must always be looking for new variations on the
trafficker’s coercive schemes.”).
33. Brittany Anthony, On-Ramps, Intersections, and Exit Routes: A Roadmap for
Systems and Industries to Prevent and Disrupt Human Trafficking, POLARIS 1, 4 (2018)
(exploring the ways in which human traffickers exploit legitimate business sectors for
their own profit and the intersection of between industries and efforts to prevent, detect,
and disrupt the trafficking scheme). “A successful trafficker, like any successful entre-
preneur, begins with a business plan built on a platform of established business models
and best practices.” Id.
34. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 34. The victim identification
process in labor trafficking cases is unique to sex trafficking cases because unlike sex
trafficking cases, where “the unlawful nature of the underlying act of prostitution brings
law enforcement into contact with potential victims and traffickers in the course of
enforcing anti-prostitution laws,” in labor trafficking, “the underlying acts of braiding hair,
harvesting crops, staffing nursing homes, or cleaning commercial buildings are not
inherently unlawful, diminishing the encounters between law enforcement and the victims
being exploited.” Hilary Axam & Jennifer Toritto Leonardo, Human Trafficking: The
Fundamentals, 65 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 3, 14 (2017). Moreover, forced labor is often hidden
although connected “through commercial supply chains that cross our borders and end
in grocery and clothing stores, high-tech corridors, car sale lots, and elsewhere.” Karen
Stauss, Forced Labor in Supply Chains: Addressing Challenges, 65 U.S. ATT’YS BULL.
169, 169 (Nov. 2017).
35. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 34.
36. See Kajal Patel, Child Prostitutes or Sexually Exploited Minors: The Deciding De-
bate in Determining How Best to Respond to Those Who Commit Crimes as a Result of
Their Victimhood, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1545, 1555 (2017). “While some [victims] are lured
by false promises by strangers, others are emotionally coerced or physically forced by
family members, neighbors, or classmates.” Butler, supra note 8, at 1292.
37. Butler, supra note 8, at 1289. “ ‘[T]he comparative immaturity and irresponsibility
of juveniles’ makes them less culpable than adults who commit crimes.” Id. at 1290 (citing
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). “[T]he Court recognized the importance of
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for victims to develop relationships with their traffickers.38 While
violent threats and other forms of abuse may occur during the re-
cruitment process, a trafficker’s relationship with a new recruit often
begins friendly or romantically, and many victims voluntarily move
in with their soon-to-be trafficker.39 These types of gradual relation-
ships later help the trafficker manipulate the victim into believing
her victimhood is voluntary and stabilize his control over her.40
Traffickers often recruit runaways who are fleeing abuse or
searching for protection, shelter, and/or companionship.41 It is esti-
mated that 450,000 children run away from their homes each year
and within the first forty-eight hours of running away, one out of
three minors are recruited into commercial sex.42 On a particularly
jarring note, some traffickers prefer to pursue what they call “throw-
aways” because, unlike runaways, no one is looking for them.43 Sexu-
ally exploited minors fall victim to coercive techniques very early.44
In fact, it is estimated that the average age of children who are
forced into human trafficking is twelve45—“well below the age at
which the law recognizes a person as mature enough to enter into
a contract, to choose to work, or to consent to sex.”46
new adolescent brain research that posits that minors have a limited ability to avoid
negative influences and that the criminal justice system must consider this evidence.”
Id. (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68–69 (2010)).
38. Id. at 1291–92. Although the archetypal human trafficking victim is typically por-
trayed as a female, the epidemic is prevalent among male victims as well, who are often
neglected in the publicity of human trafficking. See Samuel Vincent Jones, The Invisible
Man: The Conscious Neglect of Men and Boys in the War on Human Trafficking, 2010
UTAH L. REV. 1143, 1143–44 (2010).
39. See Patel, supra note 36, at 1564.
40. Id. Many traffickers develop a system to secure the victim called “finesse,” by
which he “first courts the victim with gifts and flattery and then turns the tables to take
advantage of the victim’s hope and devotion for the pimp’s own personal gain.” See
Meiers, supra note 11, at 215.
41. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Robert C. “Bobby”
Scott, Chairman, Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security), https://www
.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg58250/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg58250.pdf.
42. Id.
43. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Expert: Child Traffickers Target Runaways, “Throw-
aways,” CNN (Nov. 18, 2009, 1:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/18 /domestic
.child.trafficking/index.html [https://perma.cc/QHZ5-9LXA]. In these instances, “[t]he
child, typically homeless and in need of food and shelter, can be manipulated into ‘sur-
vival sex.’ ” Id.
44. See Patel, supra note 36, at 1547.
45. Id. However, Polaris, a non-profit in D.C. which addresses human trafficking
issues, conducted its own study in 2015 and found that “44% of these survivors estimated
that they were 17 or younger” when they first engaged in commercial sex, and the “average
age of entry was 19 years old.” See Polaris Project, The Average Age of Entry Myth,
POLARIS (Jan. 5, 2016), https://polarisproject.org/blog/2016/01/05/average-age-entry-myth
[https://perma.cc/PWS8-8ZZB].
46. Butler, supra note 8, at 1290. Depending on the state’s age of consent, child
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1. Psychological Manipulation and Coercion
After a calculated grooming process, during which the trafficker
wins over a victim’s affection and trust through attention, shelter,
food, and commodities, the trafficker begins the exploitation process
of abuse and manipulation.47 Generally, traffickers will use the least
amount of “force, fraud, [or] coercion necessary to compel their vic-
tims.”48 Traffickers often turn to psychological manipulation and
threaten the victim or her family for this very reason, as these tech-
niques alleviate the need for the trafficker to “invest in elaborate
surveillance systems or pay for guards.”49 The repeated use of these
psychological pressures, when paired with physical abuse and/or
various forced behavior, ultimately tear down the victim’s self-worth
and leave her dependent and fearful of her trafficker.50 Soon there-
after, the trafficker encourages and solicits the victim to perform
sexual acts for the benefit of the trafficker and the cycle of survival
sex ensues.51 Sadly, it is not uncommon for victims to have several
victims may be entitled to prosecutorial immunity if the state has enacted a robust safe
harbor law. See Patel, supra note 36, at 1571 (“While states have not uniformly adopted
one law determining whether a minor can consent to sex, they have adopted different
laws, namely statutory rape laws, through which states have definitively established
circumstances where minors are unable to consent to sex.”); cf. In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d
818, 822 (Tex. 2010) (overturning a 13-year-old’s prostitution misdemeanor “[b]ecause
a thirteen-year-old child cannot consent to sex as a matter of law . . . [the minor] cannot
be prosecuted as a prostitute”).
47. Patel, supra note 36, at 1555, 1565. This process is often jarring for victims be-
cause “[a] victim who has become accustomed to situations of excessive violence or violence
mixed with love may not be aware of the aberrant nature of the relationship.” See Meiers,
supra note 11, at 215.
48. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 25. The trafficker’s grooming
process and abuse can also mirror that of a domestic abuser. See Sarah Crocker, Stripping
Agency from Top to Bottom: The Need for a Sentencing Guideline Safety Valve for Bottoms
Prosecuted Under the Federal Sex Trafficking Statutes, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 753, 770 (2017).
49. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 25 (“Subtle forms of coercion can
also be more powerful. A chain-cutter can free a victim held by mere chains. A key can
open a locked door and allow a detained victim to walk free. Yet, if a trafficker renders
a victim fearful of what will happen to the victim’s family or traps the victim with some
other form of nonviolent coercion, the victim can become so helpless that even the dream
of escape begins to die.”).
50. See Patel, supra note 36, at 1564.
Though most trafficking narratives emphasize the fear and psychological
manipulation that connects victims and offenders, there is a wide range of
experiences among trafficked individuals, and the reality is that some
individuals may feel emotional connection, familial obligation, and other
complex—and potentially competing—emotions to those implicated in their
trafficking situations.
Balmgamwalla, supra note 4, at 30.
51. See Patel, supra note 36, at 1555; see also Butler, supra note 8, at 1291 (“For
these youth, prostitution is ‘survival sex’—they are not freely consenting to sell their bodies;
rather, they are coerced into ‘trading sexual relations for basic needs, including shelter,
food, and water.’ ”).
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children with their trafficker—a tactic of oppression that is espe-
cially unsettling, as the children are often used as further means of
securing the victim to the trafficker’s will.52
Once incorporated into “the Life,” victims slowly begin to be-
lieve they are criminals.53 They are taught to distrust law enforce-
ment officers and are persistently reminded of the lie that they are
just as culpable as their trafficker.54 The use of psychological abuse
against already vulnerable individuals often results in trauma
bonding between the victim and her trafficker, in which the victim
fails to identify herself as a victim of sexual exploitation and may
defend her trafficker.55 Even after victims are freed from their
captors, they remain vulnerable at the hands of law enforcement,56
52. See generally, e.g., WENDY BARNES, AND LIFE CONTINUES: SEX TRAFFICKING AND
MY JOURNEY TO FREEDOM (2015) (describing her years as a trafficking victim under the
control of a violent pimp, who was later sentenced to life in prison, and with whom she
had three children).
53. See Shared Hope International, Trafficking Terms, https://sharedhope.org/the
-problem/trafficking-terms [https://perma.cc/W3JA-VJUT]; see also Rosemary Killian &
Loretta M. Young, Human Trafficking: A Primer, 34 DEL. LAW. 9 (2016) (“[U]nfortunately,
for some victims, ‘the life’ may be their first experience of ‘family’ and belonging.”).
54. See Patel, supra note 36, at 1564 (“When law enforcement officers reinforce this
notion by refusing to recognize prostituted minors solely as victims, they echo the self-
perception of victims, who view their plight as a continuation of the abuse they suffered
for years in the child-welfare system.”); see also FREE THE SLAVES & THE HUMAN RIGHTS
CENTER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, HIDDEN SLAVES: FORCED LABOR
IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (2004), https://www.freetheslaves.net/wp-content/uploads/2015
/03/Hidden-Slaves.pdf. A victim’s fear increases through “inconsistent and unpredictable
outbursts of violence and by capricious enforcement of petty rules. The ultimate effect
of these techniques is to convince the victim that the perpetrator is omnipotent, that
resistance is futile, and that her life depends upon winning his indulgence through
absolute compliance.” Catherine McCall, Jaycee Dugard, Elizabeth Smart, and Other
Children in Captivity, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July 16, 2011), https://www.psychologytoday
.com/us/blog/overcoming-child-abuse/201107/jaycee-dugard-elizabeth-smart-and-other
-children-in-captivity [https://perma.cc/K5K7-2ZD6].
55. See Patel, supra note 36, at 1565–66. A condition called “trauma bonding” instills
the victim with feelings of love and loyalty to the trafficker. See Meiers, supra note 11,
at 215. The effects of trauma sustained over a period of time leaves victims to “lose not
only a sense of control over their ‘self,’ but also lose a sense of ‘self ’ altogether.” Zeeman
& Stauss, supra note 2, at 143. Additionally, traffickers take advantage of previously ex-
isting mental disabilities, especially in forced labor cases. See Nirav K. Desai & Sean
Tepfer, Proactive Case Identification Strategies and the Challenges of Initiating Labor
Trafficking Cases, 65 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 25, 29 (2017) (“People living with a physical or
cognitive disability inherently have a dependency on others in their life in some way. . . .
Unfortunately, others see this type of relationship as an opportunity to control another
person for their own financial benefit.”); see, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S.
931 (1988) (ruling on a historic forced labor case in which the traffickers took advantage
of and physically abused men with previously existing mental disabilities).
56. Patel, supra note 36, at 1562. The frequency of police misconduct, in the form of
forced sexual misconduct through threat of prosecution, after a victim is “rescued” can
further perpetuate her abuse. See Juhu Thukral & Melissa Ditmore, Revolving Door: An
Analysis of Street-Based Prostitution in New York City, URB. JUST. CTR. (2003), http://
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and the strength of a trafficker’s coercion can even linger into the
courtroom.57
Judge Camacho relates a story of a pimp punching a victim out in
the middle of the courtroom in front of everyone. He did it “to send
a message—I own you and no one can protect you from me—not
the police, not the prosecutor, and certainly not the person in the
black robe sitting under the sign that reads In God We Trust.”58
The victim’s plight becomes more intricate as traffickers estab-
lish a culture of mistreatment and a hierarchy of distrust among
victims.59 When traffickers target more than one victim and manage
a ring of sexually exploited victims, the psychological pressures can
be more pronounced.60 A hierarchy quickly unfolds as victims learn
to compete with one other to gain the trafficker’s approval, to dem-
onstrate their loyalty, or to escape punishment.61 Isolated from one
another, victims may depend solely on their trafficker and fail to
create meaningful relationships with other victims.62 This tactic is
beneficial for the trafficker because it prevents dissension among
the sexually exploited.63 Additionally, the culture and hierarchy of
sexworkersproject.org/downloads/RevolvingDoor.pdf [hereinafter Revolving Door]; see
also Patel, supra note 36, at 1562 n.154 (conducting a study on police misconduct against
sex workers and reporting that violence “included grabbing and kicking prostitutes,
along with beating and raping them[,] . . . fondling them and offering them cigarettes or
agreeing not to arrest them in exchange for sex”).
57. Darian Etienne, Victims, Not Criminals: Exempting and Immunizing Children
Subjected to Sex Trafficking from Prosecution for Prostitution, 16 WHITTIER J. CHILD &
FAM. ADVOC. 44, 55 (2017).
58. Id. (footnote omitted).
59. See Elizabeth Hopper & Jose Hidalgo, Invisible Chains: Psychological Coercion of
Human Trafficking Victims, 1 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 185, 196–97 (2006). “For
instance, in some large trafficking rings, traffickers create a hierarchy within the group so
that victims can rise in the ranks through compliance. In this case, some victims assert con-
trol over others who are lower in the hierarchy, acting as enforcers for the traffickers.” Id.
60. Patel, supra note 36, at 1566. “Traffickers employ a variety of control tactics,
including physical and emotional abuse, sexual assault, confiscation of identification and
money, isolation from friends and family, and even renaming victims.” See Polaris Project,
The Victims & Traffickers, POLARIS, https://polarisproject.org/victims-traffickers [https://
perma.cc/3XRQ-NPCN].
61. See Hopper & Hidalgo, supra note 59, at 196–97; Patel, supra note 36, at 1566.
Some victims also refer to their experience in sex trafficking as “the game,” because the
subculture is “complete with rules, a hierarchy of authority, and language.” See Shared
Hope International, supra note 53.
62. Patel, supra note 36, at 1566. “Traffickers work to create an isolated community
with its own rules and pressures to conform. This helps them utilize group dynamics to
ensure that victims remain destabilized.” See Hopper & Hidalgo, supra note 59, at 196.
63. See Hopper & Hidalgo, supra note 59, at 196 (“Traffickers may show favoritism,
pitting victims against each other and creating infighting. This ensures that there will
not be power in the group for resistance.”). The neurobiological effects of trauma as a
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human trafficking later create problems for law enforcement be-
cause victims have difficulty narrating their abuse or identifying
their trafficker.64
Traffickers further induce loyalty and strip victims of their in-
dividuality by renaming them, preventing them from contacting their
family members, withholding documents, constantly monitoring their
activity, and tattooing their bodies.65 Tattooing, for example, demon-
strates allegiance to the trafficker and can, again, become a compe-
tition among the victims.66 In some cases, a victim’s perception is so
distorted that her tattoos are seen as “badges” instead of as harmful
branding.67 Implicitly, these tattoos mark victims as property and
mentally chain the women to their trafficker and his criminality.68
result of trafficking can alter the way the brain stores memories, which can make a
victim be viewed as “deceptive, dishonest, or unreliable by those who are unaware of the
effects of trauma on the brain.” Zeeman & Stauss, supra note 2, at 142.
These hormones play some positive roles in reducing physical and psycho-
logical pain experienced in the moment, and activating the body for a fight,
flight, or freeze response—all of which are possible responses in different
situations, supporting the most fundamental need to preserve the physical
body in the face of an attack that the brain may perceive as threatening to life.
Id.
64. Patel, supra note 36, at 1566 (“According to some experts, this resistance could
be characterized as a dissociative disorder, which acts as a defense mechanism where
a victim puts up a barrier in his/her memory ‘in order to cope with the sexually-invasive
acts performed on her multiple times each day for weeks, months, or even years.’ ”)
(quoting Leslie Klaassen, Breaking the Victimization Cycle: Domestic Minor Trafficking
in Kansas, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 581, 588 (2013)). For a more detailed discussion on the
difficultly of victims to self-identify and the effects of trauma in trafficking victims, see gen-
erally Elizabeth K. Hopper, Polyvictimization and Developmental Trauma Adaptations
in Sex Trafficked Youth, 10 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT TRAUMA 161, 161 (2017).
65. Butler, supra note 8, at 1294.
66. See United States v. Campbell, 770 F.3d 556, 559 (7th Cir. 2014) (convicting
defendant who recruited young females into the United States illegally, and upon
gaining their trust, “required the women to break their ties with their relatives and
friends, . . . confiscated their identification, immigration documents and money,” and
“renamed them, branded them with tattoos, abused them, and forced them to engage in
prostitution for his benefit”). See generally Shared Hope International, supra note 53
(defining common terminology in sex trafficking and explaining that “branding” occurs
when a trafficker makes tattoos or carvings on a victim to indicate ownership).
67. See generally Sara Sidner, Branded: The Shocking Life of a Sex-Trafficked Girl,
CNN (Sept. 10, 2015, 9:24 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/09/09/us/freedom-project brand
ing/index.html [https://perma.cc/AQ3M-ADTT] (describing the dehumanizing nature of
branding and the prevalence of tattoos such as “old-fashioned money-bags,” “diamonds,”
“a trafficker’s name across the forehead,” “an ATM etched on the skin near [the victim’s]
groin,” and even “a barcode put on a girl’s wrist, like an item in a grocery store”).
68. See Campbell, 770 F.3d at 565 (describing how the trafficker forced his victim to
be “part of the Family” against her will and drove her to a tattoo parlor along with another
victim to receive “a tattoo on her neck modelled after [the other victim’s] neck,” and later
required each victim to “receive[ ] a tattoo covering 70 percent of her back which depicted
a scroll containing a manifesto drafted by [defendant] asserting that each woman ‘live[s]
for’ [defendant] ‘till death’ ”).
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2. The Use of Intoxicants in the Coercive Scheme
Intoxicants can be manipulated by traffickers and turned into
powerful means for coercion. There are three pertinent uses of
intoxicants in human trafficking schemes: incentives, tethers, and
anesthetics.69 These tactics can be used to manipulate a victim’s pre-
existing dependency or can actively be used to create a new addic-
tion or dependency.70 It is very common for victims to be under the
influence of drugs or alcohol when law enforcement identifies them.71
This dependency frequently originates from the beginning of the
victim’s relationship with her trafficker,72 and some refer to this
process as “breaking in.”73
“Breaking in” involves a series of emotional, physical, and psy-
chological abuses such as rape, torture, threats, degradation, and
the forced consumption of drugs and alcohol. This happens merci-
lessly during the acquirement period to break the spirit of traf-
ficked victims. Survivors have also said that shortly after arrival
they witnessed the murder of other victims. This causes victims
to go into a self-preserving state of compliance.74
First, traffickers distribute drugs and alcohol to control their
victims by using it as an incentive.75 In this regard, intoxicants are
provided to the victim in exchange for engaging in some act.76 In
some cases, traffickers will also withhold intoxicants as a form of
punishment when victims refuse to listen or participate.77 Second,
69. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 35–36.
70. Feehs & Richmond, supra note 24, at 17.
71. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 35; see, e.g., United States v.
Alaboudi, 786 F.3d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 2015) (noting that the traffickers provided alcohol,
drugs, and cigarettes to a fourteen-year-old victim after she was expelled from school).
72. Hannah Spruce, Methods of Human Trafficking and Recruitment, HUB (Feb. 15,
2017), https://www.highspeedtraining.co.uk/hub/methods-of-human-trafficking [https://
perma.cc/5NQ9-D55F].
73. Id. Others refer to this process as indoctrination, a process in which “[t]raffickers
utilize their authoritarian status to retain control over their victims.” See Hopper &
Hidalgo, supra note 59, at 196 (“Once victims have been initiated into the culture of
trafficking, there is an indoctrination phase where traffickers deepen their control over
victims.”).
74. Spruce, supra note 72. Some victims will learn to mask the pain of coercion and
“self-medicate with drugs to treat mental health issues and any pain inflicted by the
trafficker or johns.” See Meiers, supra note 11, at 216.
75. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 35; see, e.g., Alaboudi, 786 F.3d at
1139 (discussing how the victim “had no money or place to stay and was looking for drugs”
and her trafficker gave her a place to stay while incentivizing her with drugs and alcohol).
76. See, e.g., Alaboudi, 786 F.3d at 1140 (describing how the trafficker “hosted lots of
parties, used drugs, and provided drugs in exchange for sex with many of the women who
came to his apartment”).
77. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Webster, No. 08-30311, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26438,
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traffickers use drugs and alcohol as a tether.78 This occurs when the
trafficker becomes the “exclusive supplier of drugs.”79 The chemical
tether allows the trafficker to control the victim through biological
mechanisms and addiction without expending too many resources
or too much time.80 The trafficker knows the victim will later return
when they need more drugs or alcohol, allowing the victim to remain
in the community “freely.”81 Ultimately, a chemical tether makes vic-
tims all the more difficult to identify because victims are not “locked
up” or “in chains,” as sometimes portrayed in the media.82
Third, traffickers use drugs and alcohol as anesthesia.83 In this
cruel tactic, the trafficker attempts to impair the victim’s perceptions
and abilities, leaving the victim only acutely aware of the events that
are taking place and diminishing her free will.84 This tactic similarly
makes the prosecution of traffickers more difficult because victims
often have distorted or insufficient memory of their forced commer-
cial sex acts.85 Ultimately, the intersection between intoxicants and
at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2011) (where the trafficker distributed cocaine to his victims and
then withheld it when the victims refused to perform commercial sex acts).
78. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 36.
79. Id. “When traffickers and pimps find that they can exploit an addiction to produce
profit through commercial sex acts, the challenge for service providers, law enforcement,
and the entire legal system is increased exponentially.” See Lindsey N. Roberson, She
Leads a Lonely Life: When Sex Trafficking and Drug Addiction Collide, 52 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 359, 361 (2017).
80. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 36. The complexities that arise
with chemical tethers allows a trafficker to maintain control. Traffickers exploit the depth
of a victim’s addiction and “drugs play a fundamental role in keeping the victim under
control by fueling his or her addiction.” See Boggiani, supra note 5, at 923.
81. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 36; see, e.g., United States v.
Fields, No. 8:13-cr-198-T-30TGW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135763, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18,
2013), aff’d, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15679 (11th Cir. 2015) (describing how the trafficker
used a powerful prescription drug to compel his victims to perform commercial sex acts).
82. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 22, 36. Certain drugs are
particularly addictive, such as opioids, and trafficking victims are more susceptible to
addiction. See Roberson, supra note 79, at 370. As a result of the incorporation of intoxi-
cants into a trafficker’s coercive scheme, “the need for cross-sectional training for law
enforcement, service providers, and those likely to come into contact with those at risk
for exploitation, is paramount to achieving the goal not only of recognizing potential
victims, but is also the only pathway to a successful prosecution of the offenders.” Id.
83. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 36.
84. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 799 F.3d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 2015) (describing
where the trafficker operating out of a bar required his waitresses to consume large
amounts of alcohol before selling their bodies to customers).
85. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 36. The effects of trauma on the
brain can lead to victims displaying “belligerence, coldness, evasiveness, or nonchalance,”
which in turn highlights the importance of the victim’s first encounter with law enforce-
ment, especially in the interest of “effective crime detection and punishment.” Zeeman
& Stauss, supra note 2, at 142; see Hopper & Hidalgo, supra note 59, at 203–04 (explaining
the neurobiological response to “uncontrollable stress” as a “release of endogenous opioids,
or endorphins, which has an analgesic effect” and “protects the victim physically by numb-
ing physical pain and psychically creating a diminished awareness of surroundings and
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exploitative tactics in a trafficker’s coercive scheme underscores the
powerful grip a trafficker can maintain over a victim.86
B. The Effects of Coercion
Now that the trafficker’s coercive scheme has been explored in
depth, the lingering effects of systematic coercion on a survivor’s life
no longer at the mercy of a trafficker can finally be understood. While
several safe harbor laws commendably deal with prosecutorial immu-
nity for certain crimes and specialized services, the scope of state
legislative action has remained narrow and continues to unsuccess-
fully account for the collateral consequences of coercion.87 Specifically,
the states’ main limitation is their failure to protect victims from pros-
ecution for the wide variety of crimes the victims are compelled to
commit.88 Human trafficking, by definition, is a crime of coercion, and
victims are forced to commit a diverse assortment of non-violent (and
violent) crimes.89 A trafficker’s coercion is not limited to prostitution;
it is equally strong, regardless if the victim is forced to perform sexual
acts or whether she is forced to steal from a customer to meet her
trafficker’s daily quota,90 commit tax evasion,91 or violate immigra-
tion law.92
emotional numbness”); see also Rebecca Campbell, Transcript “The Neurobiology of
Sexual Assault,” NIJ (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.nij.gov/multimedia/presenter/presenter
-campbell/Pages/presenter-campbell-transcript.aspx [https://perma.cc/J2CB-MVSW].
86. See infra Section I.B.
87. See infra Section II.B. While many states have enacted expungement and vacatur
laws to vindicate survivors from the consequences of retaining a criminal record for the
crimes they committed as a direct result of their trafficking, these remedies remain
inadequate for reasons that will be discussed infra Part III.
88. See Adelson, infra note 99, at 96–98, 101; Anna Kessler, Excavating Expungement
Law: A Comprehensive Approach, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 403, 403 (2015).
89. See Richard, supra note 16, at 5–7. Victims can also commit violent crimes as a
result of their trafficking, but the legislative approach and the level of prosecutorial
discretion in those cases—while at the heart of the victim-perpetrator dilemma—are
much more clouded and obscure. See Zeeman & Stauss, supra note 2, at 139–40; see, e.g.,
Brown v. State, No. M2013-00825-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1014, at
*1–4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2014) (holding that a sixteen-year-old human trafficking
victim was sentenced to life in prison for shooting and killing a “john” after she believed
he was reaching for a gun underneath the bed).
90. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 7, 25.
91. See, e.g., National Survivor Network, Trafficking Survivor Cases: Trafficking
Survivors Relief Act of 2017 (S.104/H.R.459), https://nationalsurvivornetwork.org/policy
-advocacy [hereinafter Trafficking Survivor Cases] (detailing a survivor’s conviction for con-
spiracy to commit tax evasion and her 13-month sentence in federal prison, because her
“trafficker began demanding that [she] allow him to put the deeds for homes and cars he
had purchased in [her] name so that he could evade the attention from law enforcement”).
92. Id. (detailing a survivor’s conviction for violating federal immigration law for fi-
nancial gain because her trafficker ordered her to hide “the identification documents
from two of his victims, both of whom were in the United States illegally”).
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The impact of not extending safe harbor provisions beyond pros-
titution-related crimes is inconsistent with the notion of decriminal-
ization.93 Not only do survivors face expensive court appearances,
probation, and time in prison, but their criminal record later inhib-
its them from receiving steady jobs, decreases their eligibility for
loans and other educational opportunities, and severely hinders their
ability to secure permanent housing.94 Aside from subtle recognition
by the TVPA and Department of State Trafficking In Persons Re-
ports,95 the legal basis for immunizing the criminal conduct of traf-
ficking victims is accepted by scholars like Dr. Mohamed Mattar from
Johns Hopkins University’s Protection Project96:
Recognition of the trafficked person as a victim requires the
application of the principle of noncriminalization. That is, the
law must excuse the victim from criminal liability for the acts
committed as a result of being trafficked. Victims of trafficking
should be immune from such liability every time they commit an
illegal act as long as those acts are related to their trafficking,
whether this act is illegal entry, falsification of travel documents,
or prostitution.97
Only a few states have adopted robust immunity provisions, the
majority of which are limited to solely protecting minors.98 Given the
importance of providing holistic, rehabilitative services to trafficking
victims, states must understand the need to create a presumption of
coercion to protect victims from prosecution for the non-violent
crimes they were forced to commit.99 To understand the scope of
coercion’s effect, this Comment will next discuss the challenges that
arise when victims engage in criminal conduct at the direction of
their trafficker, the frequency of victims arrested during their
trafficking, and several of the debilitating obstacles of a criminal
record.
93. Augustson, supra note 14, at 638.
94. See infra Section I.B.3.
95. See infra notes 160–63 and accompanying text.
96. Tessa L. Dysart, Child, Victim, or Prostitute? Justice Through Immunity for
Prostituted Children, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 255, 279 (2014).
97. Mohamed Y. Mattar, Incorporating the Five Basic Elements of a Model Antitraf-
ficking in Persons Legislation in Domestic Laws: From the United Nations Protocol to the
European Convention, 14 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 357, 380–81 (2006).
98. Dysart, supra note 96, at 279.
99. Wendi J. Adelson, Child Prostitute or Victim of Trafficking?, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
96, 101 (2008) (“The Congressional debates make clear that the TVPA sought to separate
victim from offender to ensure that the law protects the victim and the culpable receive
punishment.”).
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1. When Victims Engage in Criminal Conduct
When investigators and prosecutors encounter trafficking victims
who have engaged in criminal conduct during the course of their traf-
ficking, a unique challenge arises. On one hand, the interest of justice
calls for law enforcement to consider the degree of psychological co-
ercion, the victim’s level of intent and autonomy, and the need to
protect victims from being “inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or
otherwise penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct re-
sult of being trafficked . . . .”100 On the other, law enforcement must
balance the circumstances underlying the criminal offense and the
harm inflicted to others that could have reasonably been avoided.101
While victims are certainly not exempt from liability, there are several
instances in which a trafficker coerces victims into committing
crimes102 and “then threaten[s] to report it if the victim does not
continue to ‘work’ for [him].”103 Unfortunately, these cases are over-
looked and only corrected—typically through expungement or va-
catur petitions—after a victim has been labeled a criminal by the
justice system.
In a sex trafficking case, it is common for a victim to have en-
gaged in prostitution-related offenses, such as solicitation, loitering,
or criminal trespass during the course of her trafficking.104 The stigma
behind being involved with morally charged criminal conduct (i.e.,
prostitution-related activity) adds another layer to the harms of
double victimization.105 It is less obvious, however, that trafficking
victims also commit a wide variety of non-prostitution-related of-
fenses, such as drug-related crimes,106 weapon-possession violations,107
100. Zeeman & Stauss, supra note 2, at 140, 146 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(19) (2012)).
101. Id. at 144, 146.
102. Id. at 146. The proper implementation of this balancing test, of course, assumes
that law enforcement acknowledges the importance of an initial screening and are aware
of potential indicators of victimization. Id. at 140. The initial screening “can be extremely
difficult because trafficking victims do not usually self-identify as such due to the effect
of complex trauma, . . . fear or distrust of law enforcement, lack of information about
their rights, and (perceived or actual) ongoing threats from their traffickers.” Id.
103. See Sarah Dohoney Byrne, Meeting the Legal Needs of Human-Trafficking Sur-
vivors, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 379, 381 (2017).
104. See Meiers, supra note 11, at 216.
105. See Boggiani, supra note 5, at 951 (describing the harms of double victimization
and the need to protect victims from the “ ‘hidden punishments’ deriving from the very
nature of being involved in the criminal justice system”).
106. Zeeman & Stauss, supra note 2, at 140. This is common for many victims who suffer
from addiction “[b]ecause traffickers control many sex trafficking victims via a narcotics
dependency.” Id.; see also Meiers, supra note 11, at 216 (“Drug use is often encouraged
by traffickers to lower a victim’s inhibitions in the early stages of trafficking. Traffickers
also use drugs as a means of control—a victim who is addicted to drugs is dependent
upon her drug dealer, who often is also her trafficker.”).
107. See, e.g., People v. L.G., 972 N.Y.S.2d 418, 424–25 (Crim. Ct. 2013) (vacating a
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theft,108 and immigration or visa fraud violations,109 among many
others. In People v. G.M., the victim was forced to engage in prosti-
tution as well as purchase illegal drugs on behalf of her trafficker so
that he could avoid arrest.110 According to a study conducted by
National Survivor Network (NSN) in 2015,
When asked what crimes [sex trafficking victims] were arrested
for, 65.3% respondents indicated they had been arrested for pros-
titution, 42.7% for solicitation, and 25.3% for inten[t] to solicit.
Interestingly, 40% of respondents also reported being arrested
for drug possession, and 18.7% for drug sales. 60% reported being
arrested for other crimes.111
Other times a trafficking victim may commit more serious of-
fenses as a result of her own victimization and become involved in
the recruitment and management of other victims.112 In a sex traf-
ficking scheme, the trafficker can solicit the help of a “Bottom, . . .
the girl or woman who has the longest history with the pimp or who
is favored by him,” to enforce the trafficker’s policies.113 Traffickers
use Bottoms because they are a “force multiplier,” less conspicuous,
inexpensive, and allow the trafficker to remain out of sight.114 Sig-
nificantly, it is common for Bottoms to remain fearful of their traf-
ficker and suffer from some degree of coercion even though they
have now received a more active role in the trafficking scheme; but
a case-by-case fact analysis, alongside a balance of the subsequent
victim’s interest, is required for prosecutors to determine whether
the Bottom should be held criminally liable and the best course for
her recovery.115 Bottoms can also make it difficult for prosecutors to
weapon possession conviction against a trafficking survivor “because her participation
in that offense was undeniably connected to the coerced trafficking activity”). At the
direction of a trafficker, many victims carry weapons on the streets to protect them-
selves. Id. at 421.
108. See Meiers, supra note 11, at 216.
109. See Zeeman & Stauss, supra note 2, at 140.
110. People v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762–63 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (vacating the human
trafficking survivor’s convictions for prostitution-related offenses because her trafficker
coerced her into committing the crimes).
111. See National Survivor Network Members Survey: Impact of Criminal Arrest and
Detention on Survivors of Human Trafficking, NAT’L SURVIVOR NETWORK (Aug. 2016),
https://nationalsurvivornetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/VacateSurveyFinal.pdf
[hereinafter NSN Members Survey]. From these numbers, NSN recognized their limited
resources and concluded that these statistics are not a coincidence and that “traffickers
force their victims to participate in other crimes beyond prostitution, especially drug
sales and possession.” Id.
112. See Crocker, supra note 48, at 767.
113. Butler, supra note 8, at 1294.
114. Id.
115. See Zeeman & Stauss, supra note 2, at 146. Some advocates argue that a Bottom
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obtain evidence against the trafficker, as victims are often able to
provide more evidence of a Bottom’s manipulative activity—which
typically manifests itself though recruiting others, delivering beatings,
spreading lies, and collecting the money from each victim—rather
than the actual trafficker’s acts of force, fraud, or coercion.116
Given the unique situation of trafficking survivors, there should
be a careful consideration of “whether an offense that may seem
facially unrelated to human trafficking may have been coerced or
directed by a trafficker in ways that are not immediately appar-
ent.”117 For this reason, states should adopt solutions that recognize
the power of a trafficker’s coercion and provide remedies for all non-
violent convictions committed as a direct result of being trafficked,
rather than only for prostitution offenses.118
2. The Frequency of Arrests for Crimes While Acting Under
the Coercion of a Trafficker
It is especially common for a trafficking victim to be repeatedly
arrested during the course of her trafficking. The Coalition to Abol-
ish Slavery & Trafficking (CAST) collected data regarding arrest fre-
quency for human trafficking victims.119 The results of the study
indicate that “human trafficking victims are arrested seven times
more frequently for activity directly related to their trafficking than
for non-trafficked activity.”120 Under the coercion of a trafficker,
is purely a victim and lacks the requisite level of criminal intent to be considered a perpe-
trator, while others recognize the gray area, where a victim is both a victim and criminally
responsible for her own conduct. Id. Still, some believe there are instances where a
Bottom may “not [be] subject to any force or coercion and is purely a perpetrator.” Id.
116. Butler, supra note 8, at 1294.
117. See Zeeman & Stauss, supra note 2, at 140. As a guide for prosecutors, it may be
helpful to divide the crimes committed by trafficking victims into three categories:
offenses wholly unrelated to the underlying trafficking offenses (i.e., which
were not committed “as a direct result of being trafficked”); relatively minor
or non-violent offenses—such as prostitution or working without documenta-
tion—that are directly caused by or otherwise inseparable from the trafficking
offense and for which penalizing the victim would be “inappropriate”; and
violent crimes or other significant offenses victimizing third parties that were
directly caused by or otherwise inseparable from the trafficking offense.
Id.
118. See Suzannah Phillips et al., Clearing the Slate: Seeking Effective Remedies for
Criminalized Trafficking Victims, CUNY SCH. L. 1, 15 (2014), https://ncjtc-static.fvtc.edu
/Resources/RS00002861.pdf (explaining that victims are “at risk of arrest for vagrancy,
trespass, disorderly conduct, crimes against nature, larceny, and drug and immigration
offenses”).
119. Richard, supra note 16, at 1. “The Coalition to Abolish Slavery & Trafficking
(CAST), a not-for-profit organization established in 1988, provides comprehensive long-
term services to human trafficking victims.” Id. at 2.
120. Id. at 1. Additionally, the NSN survey expanded upon this number and revealed
that 90.8% of trafficking survivors had criminal convictions, over 23% had been arrested
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victims are forced into criminal activity and are arrested up to thirty
or forty times in only a few years for solely trafficking-related of-
fenses.121 Although the victim-perpetrator dilemma blurs the line
between “victim” and “perpetrator,” this sobering data emphasizes the
need to protect trafficking victims from unnecessary prosecution.122
CAST assembled a customized database to “learn about and
address the complexities of human trafficking cases, evaluate and
improve the long-term services that victims need in order to rebuild
their lives, and assess survivors’ progress in reaching service goals.”123
The database contains information regarding 926 adult and minor
victims from both sex and labor trafficking.124 The statistics reveal
that victims face high numbers of arrests and convictions during
their trafficking as a result of a trafficker’s coercion.125
According to the research, 69% of the victims studied had arrest
records, and of those with arrest records, 67% had at least one arrest
directly related to their trafficking.126 Among this subset, 54% “only
ha[d] arrest records directly related to their trafficking.”127 In fact, the
victims who were arrested only for crimes directly related to their
trafficking “were arrested between one and 42 times, with an aver-
age of 14.86 arrests.”128 Conversely, victims who were arrested only
for crimes unrelated to their trafficking were arrested an average of
more than 10 times, and over 6% had been arrested more than 30 times. See NSN Members
Survey, supra note 111.
121. Richard, supra note 16, at 7. The NSN survey also indicated that “over half of all
[victim] respondents believed that 100% of their arrests/charges/convictions were directly
related to their trafficking experience.” See NSN Members Survey, supra note 111.
122. Richard, supra note 16, at 1. The data also emphasizes the need to reform the
justice systems treatment of trafficked persons and to view these individuals as victims,
not as perpetrators, of a crime. Id.
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id. at 4 (“Although CAST attempts to include complete information for each
individual in its database, some fields were unknown and were thus excluded from the
results . . . .”).
125. Id. at 3. The criminal records of a subset of 61 recent trafficking victims were
reviewed for purposes of this analysis. Id. at 5. Specifically, “each arrest was categorized
as either ‘directly related’ or ‘unrelated’ to the trafficking. Arrests that occurred during the
trafficking time period were considered to be directly related to the trafficking. Arrests
that occurred either before or after the trafficking time period were considered unrelated
to the trafficking.” Richard, supra note 16, at 5. Notably, CAST recognizes that its sample
size is not large enough to fully illustrate the association between arrests and trafficking
with undisputable statistical analysis. Id. However, the data provides a clear starting
point and reveals the need for “government and private agencies [to] share data . . . to
conduct a large-scale statistical analysis.” Id.
126. Id. at 6.
127. Id.
128. Id. For example, “Penny (not her real name) was forced into commercial sex at
age 12. Before she turned 14, she had been arrested seven times for prostitution, false
ID, and theft. . . . Penny was arrested 42 times during her nine years of being trafficked.”
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
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two times.129 Therefore, trafficking victims “arrested only in relation
to their trafficking are arrested [seven times] more often than those
arrested only for activity unrelated to their trafficking.”130 Even
among the victims arrested for both directly related and unrelated
crimes, “the vast majority of the arrests are directly related” to the
victim’s trafficking.131
These statistics underscore the fact that human trafficking vic-
tims are frequently arrested in the course of their coercion.132 More-
over, the results are noteworthy because they demonstrate that
victims are arrested significantly less when they are no longer being
trafficked.133 Most importantly, though, these statistics dismantle
the assumption that trafficking victims have high numbers of arrests
simply because the victims involved are generally prone to criminal
activity.134 While it is true that victims voluntarily commit crimes
and routinely fall back into trafficking—usually as a result of some
combination of ineffective victim services, the general difficulty of
overcoming trauma, and lack of familial support—the assumption
that trafficking victims are inherently “criminal” is harmful and
untrue, as evidenced by the CAST database.135
3. The Obstacles of a Criminal Record
There are overwhelming consequences of not providing human
trafficking victims with a rebuttable presumption that any non-violent
129. See Richard, supra note 16, at 6.
130. Id. (emphasis omitted).
131. Id.
132. See id. at 7.
133. See id. The study discusses which arrests were not “in relation to” a victim’s traf-
ficking and, therefore, it is also possible that the data could reasonably suggest that any
arrest not “in relation to” a victim’s trafficking could be for an offense committed while still
being trafficked, but entirely unrelated to the trafficking coercion. Id. at 6. However, as
mentioned, the fact-by-fact analysis can make it difficult to ascertain which offenses were
entirely divorced from a trafficker’s coercion. See, e.g., Richard, supra note 16, at 6.
134. See Rachel Austin & Amy Farrell, Human Trafficking and the Media in the
United States, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10 (Apr. 2017), http:// oxford
re.com/criminology/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.001.0001/acrefore-9780 190264
079-e-290?print=pdf.
135. See Jessica Emerson & Alison Aminzadeh, Left Behind: How the Absence of a Fed-
eral Vacatur Law Disadvantages Survivors of Human Trafficking, 16 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 239, 257 (2016) (recognizing that criminalizing victims “results
in recidivism, continued exploitation, or the chronic instability that comes with an inability
to heal from trauma.”); Cherish Adams, Re-Trafficked Victims: How a Human Rights Ap-
proach Can Stop the Cycle of Re-Victimization of Sex Trafficking Victims, 43 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 201, 202 (2011) (stating that the “failure to be treated as a victim and receive
support causes many victims to be re-trafficked”). “For instance, research on victim identi-
fication suggests that when judges, prosecutors, and police officers are faced with a ‘bad
victim’ who does not resemble the constructed ideal victim of human trafficking, they are
reluctant to treat these individuals as victims at all.” Austin & Farrell, supra note 134,
at 10.
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crime committed during the course of their trafficking is a result
thereof and thereby not prosecutable.136 The long-term effects of
arrest, conviction, detention, and/or fines severely hinder the success-
ful recovery of victims and extend well beyond the obvious punish-
ment of prison and probation.137 Additionally, prosecution-focused
tactics may leave trafficking victims scarred with criminal records
that unduly burden their educational opportunities, psychological
well-being, employment prospects, financial stability, and eligibility
for federal funding.138 One survivor describes her struggle to overcome
an arrest record as “the invisible bars even though I am free.”139
According to the American Bar Association, there are approxi-
mately 40,309 federal, state, and local collateral consequences in-
dividuals with a criminal record face.140 Of which, three primary
consequences will be addressed here. First, employment opportuni-
ties severely diminish when victims retain a criminal history of arrests
and convictions.141 This is because an estimated 80% or more United
136. See Richard, supra note 16, at 7; see also Patel, supra note 36, at 1561 (“[T]he
trauma associated with trafficking and its psychological effects can be devastating and,
if left unaddressed, can undermine victims’ recovery and potentially contribute to their
vulnerability to re-victimization.”).
137. See Kessler, supra note 88, at 405.
Failing to recognize a person as a potential victim of trafficking may . . .
hamper opportunities to deal with trafficking in persons offenders through
interdiction, investigation and prosecution. The problems are compounded
if such a person is treated as a criminal. Building trust is essential to gaining
the cooperation of a victim. An arrest and detention will cause a serious set
back or destroy any chance of building that trust.
Anti-human Trafficking Manual for Criminal Justice Practitioners, Module 11, UNITED
NATIONS OFF. DRUGS & CRIME 2–3 (2009), http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-traf
ficking/TIP_module11_Ebook.pdf.
138. Richard, supra note 16, at 1; see Amanda Geller et al., The Effects of Incarceration
on Employment and Wages: An Analysis of the Fragile Families Survey 1, 24 (Ctr. for
Res. on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper No. 2006-01-FF, 2006), https://pdfs.semantic
scholar.org/a748/257cf094a1868ba70514c09098462f2c5dde.pdf.
139. Richard, supra note 16, at 10. The “elusive nature” of a criminal record’s collateral
consequences “can prove even more detrimental than a period of confinement” because
“[t]hey are not specifically ordered by a sentencing judge but rather exist as a function
of our system of retributive laws, inhibiting and discouraging productive engagement in
society.” See Kessler, supra note 88, at 406–07.
140. American Bar Association, National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of
Conviction, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/database/results/?jurisdiction=&consequence
_category=&narrow_category=&triggering_offense_category=&consequence_type&dura
tion_category=&page_number=1 [https://perma.cc/RML9-3QBZ]. This number is a count
of the effects of different state and local regulations of the same types. Id. In the NSN
study, discussed above, 72.7% of survivors surveyed reported that the long-term effects
of arrest and convictions had created an employment barrier, and over 57.6% reported
it a housing barrier. See NSN Members Survey, supra note 111.
141. See Richard, supra note 16, at 10. “The Supreme Court has held that an arrested
individual has no right to privacy in his arrest information. The fact of an arrest may not
be used directly to bar employment by itself. However, arrest information is available
to, and can be considered by, potential employers.” Id. at 11.
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States employers use criminal background checks during the hiring
process.142 Moreover, the mass digitization and dissemination of crimi-
nal history in the modern world further exacerbate this issue.143
Even when a victim’s criminal record has been expunged or sealed,
private companies often still have these details in their database.144
Second, there are lasting psychological impacts of detention and
arrest.145 Research shows that “being arrested, often handcuffed, taken
to a police station, booked, and held overnight causes serious psycho-
logical distress.”146 Criminal arrests are traumatic experiences and
once in the custody of law enforcement, victims may be subject to more
stressful situations.147 Any skepticism or manipulation by law en-
forcement, added to such tactics having been used by the victim’s
trafficker, will often aggravate the victim’s trauma.148 A survivor’s
reintegration into normalcy becomes even more challenging if they
have spent a significant amount of time in “the Life.”149
142. See id. at 11; see also Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the
Presence of Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 329 (2009).
143. See Kessler, supra note 88, at 403 (“[T]he modern information age has created an
uphill battle for any efforts to obtain criminal history privacy.”). Further, the common law
right of public access to criminal history information and judicial records—established in
1970 by the Supreme Court—makes effective expungement and vacatur laws difficult to
implement. See id. at 409–10; see also Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,
597 (1978).
144. See Richard, supra note 16, at 12; see also Joe Palazzolo & Gary Fields, Fight Grows
to Stop Expunged Criminal Records Living On in Background Checks, WALL STREET J.
(May 7, 2015, 4:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fight-grows-to-stop-expunged-criminal
-records-living-on-in-background-checks-1430991002 [https://perma.cc/5XWN-F2VC].
145. Richard, supra note 16, at 15. Specifically, with sexually exploited minors, the harm-
ful process of arrest and detention can re-traumatize victims and ultimately “strengthen
trauma bonds with traffickers who have warned victims that they would be arrested and
blamed if they were to seek help from law enforcement or were ‘found out.’ ” Rachel
Harper, Shifting Towards Justice: Non-Criminalization of Child Sex Trafficking Victims,
SHARED HOPE INT’L (Apr. 5, 2016), https://sharedhope.org/2016/04/shifting-towards-jus
tice-non-criminalization-child-sex-trafficking-victims [https://perma.cc/XE4X-VLQK].
146. Richard, supra note 16, at 15.
147. See, cf., Cynthia Soohoo, Criminalization of Trafficking Victims, UNITED NATIONS
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REV. U.S. AM. (May 2015), http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics
/iwhr/publications/Criminalization-of-Trafficking-Victims.pdf. For example, “[i]n New York
City [victims] can be held up to 24 hours in the ‘squalid’ and ‘chronically overcrowded’ cen-
tral booking facility. They may be forced to remain unclothed for long periods of time and
are often subjected to inappropriate conduct and harassment while in custody.” Id. at 3.
148. Richard, supra note 16, at 15. Trafficking survivors are vulnerable to being manipu-
lated by law enforcement into testifying against their trafficker or chastised for refusing
to do so. See Emerson & Aminzadeh, supra note 135, at 246 (“For some, the threat of prose-
cution is used as a tool to get them to testify against their traffickers in court. This can
result in trafficking survivors being treated as ‘instruments of criminal investigation,
rather than as holders of rights.’ ”).
149. Lori Basheda, Sex Trafficking Victim: “Just Because I Was Beaten or Raped . . .
That’s not All that I Am,” BEHIND BADGE (Jan. 20, 2016), http://behindthebadgeoc.com
/?p=12178 [https://perma.cc/6524-VA8D]. According to one sex trafficking survivor, Oree
Freeman, a survivor’s perception of “normal” becomes warped because “[n]ormal is [now]
scary. Love and support is not normal. Quiet is not normal.” Id.
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Third, criminal records can lead to short-term and long-term
housing, education, and financial problems.150 Victims are often sent
to emergency shelters for domestic violence victims because shelter
options are limited.151 The long-term hurdles created by a victim’s
criminal record may disqualify her from “access [to] long-term, afford-
able, safe and stable housing.”152 Further, a victim’s credit may be
affected, leaving her with little access to federal lending assistance
and more susceptible to lending discrimination.153 In reality, a vic-
tim’s educational opportunities are also adversely affected because
“[f]ederal law suspends eligibility for education grants, loans, and
work assistance for students convicted of offenses involving the
possession or sale of controlled substances while receiving student
aid.”154 Acknowledging that these are only a few categories of the
ways in which a criminal record can constrain a survivor’s recovery,
states must address the survivor’s need for a clean criminal history
if they want to see her successfully reintegrate into society without
unnecessary scars of her trafficking.155
II. CURRENT STATE OF ANTI-HUMAN TRAFFICKING LAW
Fortunately, states are beginning to recognize the need to provide
holistic protection to human trafficking victims.156 For states, safe
150. See David Thacher, The Rise of Criminal Background Screening in Rental Housing,
33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 5, 6 (2008).
151. See id. at 17; see also Amanda Peters, Disparate Protections for American Human
Trafficking Victims, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2013) (Many homeless shelters and
runaway homes have “[e]xclusion criteria”—including “drug addictions, violent behavior,
or mental health conditions, all of which are common for victims of human trafficking
to experience”—which effectively disqualify trafficking survivors from obtaining
emergency housing). Other shelters do not categorize a survivor as a “real” domestic
violence victim, while others “are unable to house individuals of different ages, genders,
and sexual orientation.” Id. at 34.
152. Richard, supra note 16, at 19. “Federal Housing laws currently permit providers
of public, Section 8, and other federally assisted housing to perform criminal background
checks on individuals applying for public housing.” Id. Additionally, some states have broad
interpretation of a victim’s “criminal activity,” leaving room for “even arrests without
conviction [to] bar access to affordable and stable housing.” Id. at 20.
153. Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, New Frontiers in Fair Lending: Confronting Lending Dis-
crimination Against Ex-Offenders, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1237, 1243 (2005).
154. Richard, supra note 16, at 20. “Of course, once an individual has acquired criminal
history record information, even if by court error, it is now his or her legal and financial
burden to correct the inaccuracies that may be keeping him or her from employment,
education, and housing opportunities.” See Hancock, supra note 21, at 523.
155. See id. at 521 (“Overcharging not only unfairly extracts plea agreements, but it
also leads to unnecessary incarceration in other ways as well.”).
156. Id. at 528. In addition to New York, other States “have worked toward creating
legislation to protect trafficking victims from criminal liability.” Augustson, supra note
14, at 642. For example, “[i]n the first regular session of 2015, the Arizona House of
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harbor laws must be based on the recognition that “[e]ven after [vic-
tims] escape . . . [human] trafficking, the criminal record victimizes
them for life.”157 To give victims a deserved, second chance, however,
states must go further and create a presumption of coercion that
shields victims from unnecessary prosecution for the criminal of-
fenses they were forced to commit as a direct result of their traffick-
ing.158 Perhaps a new federal Model Law, as discussed below, is needed
to provide state legislatures with the support they need to draft con-
sistent and effective safe harbor legislation with a rebuttable pre-
sumption provision regarding coercion.159
A. Federal Criminalization of Human Trafficking: Trafficking
and Violence Protection Act of 2000
In 2000, Congress recognized the human trafficking problem by
passing the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA).160 Partly as
a result of pressure from human rights activists and non-profit
organizations, the TVPA criminalized human trafficking by making
it a federal felony and adopted a federal policy to focus on prosecu-
tion, protection, and prevention.161 The Department of Justice then
prepared the Model State Anti-Trafficking Criminal Statute (Model
Law) in 2004, with the hope that state anti-trafficking laws could ef-
fectively and consistently address the crime.162 Although the Model
Law is not ratified legislation, it served as a practical guideline for
state legislatures.163 The Model Law acknowledges that current federal
Representatives also put forth an amendment that would allow human-trafficking
victims to vacate prostitution or non-dangerous offenses that were committed as a direct
result of being a human-trafficking victim.” Id. (emphasis added).
157. Id.
158. See infra Sections II.B, IV.A.
159. See, e.g., Richard, supra note 16, at 15; see also Patel, supra note 36, at 1563
(“[W]hen [victims] are released, they gain nothing more than a criminal record and
usually more trauma from the experience than what they had faced earlier.”).
160. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C.A. § 7101 (West) (2000).
161. 22 U.S.C.A. § 7101(b)(24); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT
5 (2006), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/66086.pdf.
162. Model State Anti-Trafficking Criminal Statute, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (2004),
https://web.archive.org/web/20091201110112/http://www.justice.gov/crt/crim/model
_state_law.pdf [hereinafter Model Law]. Given that the Model Law is now fourteen years
old, there are other models states look to that are more comprehensive, such as the ULC’s
Uniform Act to combat trafficking. See Butler, supra note 8, at 1316; NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS
UNIFORM ST. LAWS, ULC Unif. Act on Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking
1, 2 (2013).
163. Additionally, the U.S. Senate encouraged states to follow the Model Law and even
passed a resolution endorsing the statute. Model Law, supra note 162, at 6; see S. Res.
414, 108th Cong. (2004) (“[E]nactment of comprehensive State laws criminalizing human
trafficking . . . may be necessary to ensure that Federal efforts are accompanied by
robust efforts at the State and local levels.”).
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law must also be supported by robust state anti-trafficking laws to
collectively address the crime.164 As an incentive, states may receive
grants under the TVPA to “develop, expand, or strengthen victim ser-
vice programs for victims of trafficking, including programs that
provide housing to victims of trafficking.”165
The TVPA has undergone several reauthorizations since 2000
and now provides funding for victims, resources and training for law
enforcement’s anti-trafficking efforts, and collects global data to
determine best practices for anti-trafficking legislation.166 In line with
the recommendations of this Comment, the TVPA also acknowledges
the need to protect survivors from being “inappropriately” punished
for acts committed “as a direct result of being trafficked.”167 More-
over, in its 2014 Trafficking In Persons Report, the United States
Department of State explained that trafficking victims,
should not be held liable for their involvement in unlawful activ-
ities that are a direct consequence of their victimization. Traf-
ficked individuals who are forced to commit a crime are commonly
mistaken for criminals—rather than being identified as victims—
and therefore treated as such by law enforcement and judicial
officials.168
Nevertheless, federal anti-trafficking efforts fail to adequately re-
solve the victim-perpetrator dilemma.169 Despite this shortcoming,
164. John Tanagho, Comment, New Illinois Legislation Combats Modern-Day Slavery:
A Comparative Analysis of Illinois Anti-Trafficking Law with Its Federal and State
Counterparts, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 895, 918 (2007) (“State laws will result in increased
prosecutions and a potential added deterrent to traffickers. Furthermore, state anti-
trafficking legislation is needed because . . . state and local authorities are usually first
to discover trafficking victims.”).
165. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C.A. § 7105(b)(2)(A) (West)
(2000). Under the TVPA, coercion is defined as:
(A) threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; (B)
any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure
to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against
any person; or (C) the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process.
Id. § 7102(3).
166. See, e.g., Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, Pub. L. No.
113-183, 128 Stat. 1919, 1920–21, 1933, 1946 (2014).
167. 22 U.S.C.A. § 7101(b)(19) (West) (2012). The United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights contains similar language: “[t]rafficked persons shall
not be detained, charged or prosecuted for . . . their involvement in unlawful activities to
the extent that such involvement is a direct consequence of their situation as trafficked
persons.” See OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Recommended Principals
and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking 1, 1 (May 20, 2002), https://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Traffickingen.pdf.
168. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 14 (June 14, 2014), http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/226844.pdf.
169. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127
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the TVPA has successfully sought to combat human trafficking in
the United States and continues to encourage states to enact victim-
centered anti-human trafficking legislation.170
B. Emergence of State Safe Harbor Laws
To date, every state and U.S. territory has some form of an anti-
trafficking criminal statute.171 Many states have gone further in
terms of victim-centered legislation and enacted safe harbor statutes
that protect sexually exploited minors by not convicting them of
prostitution—or, in some states, a prostitution-related crime that
was committed as a result of trafficking.172 Safe harbor statutes
“seek[ ] to offer and engage victims in rehabilitative services in lieu
of charging them with a crime.”173 The two goals that underlie safe
harbor laws are: “(1) to provide legal protection to those forced, com-
pelled, or induced to commit a crime, and (2) to provide ready access
to necessary services such as psychological and medical treatment,
housing, and rehabilitation services.”174
As of June 2018, thirty-four states had enacted safe harbor pro-
visions.175 However, most safe harbor legislation limits the scope of
protection to “children that have been . . . sexually exploited,” and
the typical “legal protections offered [only] apply to prostitution and
prostitution-related crimes.”176 Effective safe harbor laws, in contrast,
must be based on an understanding of the complexities of victim
Stat. 54, 144 (2013); William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008); Trafficking Victims Protection Re-
authorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (2005); Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (2003).
170. See generally Peters, supra note 151.
171. See 2018 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 444 (2018), https://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/282798.pdf [hereinafter TIP REPORT 2018].
172. See Rich Williams, Safe Harbor: State Efforts to Combat Child Trafficking, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEG. 1, 1 (Apr. 2017) (describing the current status of state safe harbor legislation
in detail).
173. Sarah Wasch et al., An Analysis of Safe Harbor Laws for Minor Victims of Commer-
cial Sexual Exploitation: Implications for Pennsylvania and Other States, U. PA. FIELD
CTR. 1, 1 (2016). “By the end of 2015, a full two-thirds of states had passed some version
of ‘Safe Harbor’ legislation.” Id.
174. Patel, supra note 36, at 1561. States are beginning to recognize that “[p]rosecu-
tion and detainment of victimized children repeat[ ] the cycle of trauma and control that
they have already experienced during their trafficking, and leaves youth with a criminal
record for crimes that were perpetrated against them.” Wasch et al., supra note 173, at 5.
However, some scholars argue that “when victims are not detained, they will not cooperate
with prosecution of traffickers and/or purchasers of illegal commercial sex.” Id. at 7.
175. TIP REPORT 2018, supra note 171, at 444; see also Wasch et al., supra note 173,
at 2.
176. Human Trafficking Issue Brief: Safe Harbor, POLARIS PROJECT (2015), https://
polarisproject.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Safe%20Harbor%20Issue%20Brief.pdf.
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identification and the needs of human trafficking victims.177 Limiting
safe harbor protection to only prostitution-related offenses adversely
impacts the recovery of victims and severely discredits our under-
standing of the depth of a trafficker’s coercion.178 While states recog-
nize the importance of decriminalization, prosecutorial discretion,
and diversion programming, safe harbor laws remain wholly inade-
quate because the scope of their protection is limited and states
remain inconsistent in their approaches.179
1. Immunity from Prosecution and Diversion Programs
There are two main categories that safe harbor provisions can
fall under: decriminalization and diversion.180 The distinction between
the two is at the heart of effective safe harbor statutes and robust
rehabilitation for survivors.181 First, decriminalization of trafficked
youth occurs when states grant youth immunity for the prostitution-
related crimes committed while being trafficked.182 Such immunity
protects child victims from facing certain legal consequences for
acting under the coercion of their trafficker,183 and twenty states
and the District of Columbia provide trafficked youth with criminal
immunity for prostitution or prostitution-related offenses.184
Second, diversion programs are meant to “provide[] officials with
the ability to divert trafficked youth away from the justice system to
programs and services that address their underlying needs.”185 States
177. Wasch et al., supra note 173, at 2. Further, the 2018 TIP Report’s United States
country narrative notes that even in states with safe harbor laws that aim to “protect”
trafficked youth, children still faced arrest. See TIP REPORT 2018, supra note 171, at 444.
178. See supra Section I.B.
179. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Attacking Human Trafficking Through Legislative Change,
52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 457, 475 (2017) (explaining the need for state “uniformity because
human trafficking is a complex process that occurs over a continuum and potentially cros-
ses state lines”); Williams, supra note 172, at 1 (noting that the recent trend is to treat
“trafficked youth as survivors of trauma . . . rather than as perpetrators of crimes they
were forced to commit”).
180. Williams, supra note 172, at 4.
181. Id. (“Proponents of [prosecutorial] immunity and diversion [to survivor services]
contend that they keep youth from continued trauma in the justice system and prevent
them from compiling criminal records that can make it difficult to pursue future housing,
employment and education opportunities.”).
182. Id.; see also Vanessa Bouche et al., Identifying Effective Counter-Trafficking Pro-
grams and Practices in the U.S.: Legislative, Legal, and Public Opinion Strategies that
Work, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE CTR. 1, 12 (2016) (noting that the prosecution of
traffickers has increased since minors have been granted prosecutorial immunity because
minors are now more likely to cooperate in the investigations).
183. Wasch et al., supra note 173, at 5.
184. Williams, supra note 172, at 4.
185. Id. at 5.
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that have chosen not to provide immunity have instead “created a di-
version to social services program for minors [who] are arrested or
charged.”186 Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia offer
diversion programs for trafficked youth.187 The most protective state
provisions grant both immunity and offer diversion programming with
specialized services.188 Fortunately, eighteen states and the District
of Columbia have done so.189
2. Safe Harbor Laws of Minnesota, Tennessee, and New York
Safe harbor statutes vary from state to state, and some are more
effective than others.190 Minnesota, Tennessee, and New York have
had varying degrees of success, and an analysis of each will provide
insight into the common limitations and procedural hurdles of safe
harbor legislation.191 In 2010, New York became the first state to enact
safe harbor legislation.192 Shortly after, in 2011, Minnesota passed
safe harbor legislation.193 Minnesota is considered model legislation
and was the first state to conduct a “First Year Evaluation Over-
view” of its safe harbor laws, where it found a dramatic “increase in
cooperation with law enforcement” and a higher number of “convic-
tions against traffickers since passing Safe Harbor legislation.”194
186. Wasch et al., supra note 173, at 2.
187. Williams, supra note 172, at 4.
188. Wasch et al., supra note 173, at 2 (“Effective Safe Harbor statutes must address
not only the issue of whether to charge a youth or provide immunity from prosecution
(decriminalization), but also whether or how to obtain appropriate referrals to service
providers regardless of legal outcomes.”).
189. Williams, supra note 172, at 5.
190. See supra notes 171–89 and accompanying text; infra notes 191–95 and accom-
panying text.
191. See 2017 State Report Cards—Protected Innocence Challenge, SHARED HOPE INT’L,
https://sharedhope.org/what-we-do/bring-justice/reportcards/2017-reportcards [https://per
ma.cc/PX25-EA4T] (ranking states on their response to the domestic sex trafficking of
minors). In its 2017 Report, Shared Hope gave Minnesota a “B” (with a raw score of 89%),
Tennessee an “A” (with a raw score of 96.5%), and New York a “D” (with a raw score of
66%). Id. at 23–25. Tennessee received the highest score of all U.S. states. Id.
192. Karen W. Weiss, Steps to Safety: A Guide to Drafting Safe Harbor Legislation to
Protect Sex-Trafficked Children, 15 ECPAT USA 1, 39 (2015); see New York Safe Harbor
for Exploited Youth Act, 2008 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 569 (A. 5258-C) (McKinney). New
York’s safe harbor provision provided the backbone for non-profits and victim-advocates
to implement safe harbor laws in various states. See Marisa Nack, Note, The Next Step:
The Future of New York State’s Human Trafficking Law, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 817, 821 (2010)
(“At the time of enactment, commentators praised the legislation as one of the nation’s
strongest and most comprehensive anti-trafficking laws.”).
193. Williams, supra note 172, at 7; see Safe Harbor for Sexually Exploited Youth Act,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4716 (West 2013).
194. Wasch et al., supra note 173, at 1, 8. Of the 163 referrals that were made during
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Finally, Tennessee passed its safe harbor legislation in 2012, which
provides victims with both immunity from prosecution for prostitu-
tion and diversion opportunities.195
Concerning the way these states treat the commercial sexual
exploitation of children (CSEC) in the criminal justice system, both
Minnesota and Tennessee provide trafficked minors immunity for en-
gaging in commercial sex.196 However, each state has a different age
requirement for a victim to be categorized as a “minor.”197 Minne-
sota’s safe harbor provision is known as “No Wrong Door” and includes
“a mandatory diversion for the first offense of prostitution or
prostitution-related charges for 16 and 17 year olds.”198 In contrast,
“youth [in Minnesota] under 16 years old are deemed not delinquent
and are immune from prosecution for sex crimes.”199 Therefore, victims
in Minnesota between the ages of sixteen and eighteen are caught
in a “gray area” in which they are no longer protected by prosecutorial
immunity but may still receive benefits from specialized diversion pro-
grams if it is their first arrest.200 Tennessee law is similar to Minne-
sota with respect to its approach to decriminalization, but protects
a larger population of victims because it prohibits anyone under the
age of eighteen to be charged with a crime of prostitution.201
Taking a different approach, New York categorizes trafficked
youth as “abused children” but does not decriminalize children en-
gaged in commercial sex, meaning that child victims of trafficking
in New York may be arrested and charged.202 However, New York’s
safe harbor laws do allow for diversion to services upon the request
the study, 129 victims voluntarily accepted and participated in services because “there
were no pending criminal charges or detainment.” Id. at 6.
195. Williams, supra note 172, at 4; see also Dysart, supra note 96, at 285; J. Ryan
Dalton, Modern-Day Slavery: Lawyers Help Fight Human Trafficking in Tennessee, TENN.
B.J. 12, 16 (2013).
196. Weiss, supra note 192, at 15.
197. See infra notes 198–200.
198. Wasch et al., supra note 173, at 2. The No Wrong Door initiative “also established
additional services focusing on trauma-informed care and culturally specific services and
housing.” Williams, supra note 172, at 7.
199. Wasch et al., supra note 173, at 2 (emphasis added).
200. Melissa Golke, The Age of Consent: How Minnesota’s Safe Harbor for Sexually Ex-
ploited Youth Act of 2011 Falls Short of Fully Addressing Domestic Child Sex Trafficking,
33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 201, 220 (2011). However, in 2016 under No Wrong Door,
the age of eligibility for services in Minnesota was raised from eighteen to twenty-four.
2016 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 189, Sec. 2, Subd. 3 (West).
201. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-513(d) (2015); see also Dalton, supra note 195, at 12,
17. But cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-82(a) (2016) (where only a “person eighteen years of
age or older” may be “guilty of prostitution”).
202. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(e)(iii) (McKinney 2018). Additionally, New York’s defi-
nition of an abused child includes children who have been trafficked by a “person legally
responsible,” which can also mean a relative. § 1012(e).
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and consent of the child defendant.203 New York also allows for com-
mercially exploited children and young adults to be certified as
“Persons In Need of Supervision” (PINS), rather than juvenile de-
linquents.204 Once certified, a child may no longer be detained and
will instead receive services through the Department of Social Ser-
vices.205 About one-third of states currently do not have safe harbor
statutes and offer neither immunity nor diversion for victims of
human trafficking.206 Without consistent safeguards across all states,
victims will continue to receive unequal treatment and endure pre-
ventable hardship.
Effective victim-centered services for commercially exploited
children are difficult to provide because trafficking victims have di-
verse needs, including emergency shelter, food, transportation, sexual
assault care, mental health treatment, counseling, and even case
management services.207 Nevertheless, services are crucial for the
rehabilitative process of victims and their healing process.208 In
Tennessee, although no services are statutorily defined, “[e]nforcement
[officers] must provide sexually exploited child[ren] with the tele-
phone number for the National Human Trafficking Resource Center
hotline and must release the minor to [her] parents.”209 Tennessee’s
lack of statutorily defined services and the state’s failure to include
provisions for funding may both be detrimental to the state’s ability
to provide consistent rehabilitation for trafficked youth.210
203. See Weiss, supra note 192, at 16; see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4(3) (McKinney
2010). Other states allow diversion opportunities at the discretion of judge, prosecutor,
or both. See Weiss, supra note 192, at 16.
204. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(a) (McKinney 2014). Although not mandated, the
“[c]onversion from juvenile delinquency complaint (if under 16) or Criminal Court
complaint (if between 16 and 18) to Family Court person-in-need-of-services petition” is
permitted. Weiss, supra note 192, at 16.
205. Williams, supra note 172, at 5. If, for whatever reason, the commercially exploited
minor does not qualify for PINS certification, then she does not receive the services or
benefits of its protection. See infra Part III.
206. See Williams, supra note 172, at 4–5. Many states have been reluctant to pass
safe harbor laws for reasons that will be addressed more fully infra Section IV.D.
207. See VIRGINIA DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS. RESEARCH CTR., Report on the
Human Trafficking Services Needs Assessment Survey 1, 2 (Sept. 2012), https://www.dcjs
.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/victims/human-trafficking-services
-needs-assessment-survey.pdf. Unfortunately, a 2012 study conducted by Virginia Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice Services Research Center found that over 80% of the agencies
and organizations responsible for meeting these needs responded that they were unable
to adequately do so. Id. at 2, 16.
208. See Peters, supra note 151, at 36. In addition to immediate housing opportunities,
“victims need clothing, food, financial assistance, medical treatment, mental health treat-
ment, legal assistance, substance abuse treatment, transportation, life skills training,
education, work skills training, employment, and where appropriate, reunification with
loving, supportive family members.” Id.
209. Weiss, supra note 192, at 16; see H.B. 0035, 107th Gen. Assemb. § 1 (Tenn. 2011).
210. Weiss, supra note 192, at 44.
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In contrast, Minnesota and New York both have statutorily de-
fined specialized services for commercially exploited children.211 In
Minnesota, it is mandated that sexually exploited youth receive hous-
ing and that grants be awarded to service providers through the
Commissioner of Human Services and the Homeless Youth Act
Fund.212 Minnesota provides child victims who are in immediate
danger the option of emergency detention, during which they may
be “held in secure placement for up to 72 hours upon court order,”
and holds mandatory training programs for law enforcement, social
services, and medical professionals.213 More comprehensively, though,
the Family Court in New York can order services, such as “housing
in specialized short- and long-term safe houses,” and local social ser-
vices are required to provide for an exploited child’s “welfare needs,”
such as “housing, food, clothing, [and] counseling.”214 New York im-
plements this approach through a presumption that commercially
exploited children are victims of human trafficking and a diversion to
specialized services.215 New York’s diversion programming could be
coupled with prosecutorial immunity, like Minnesota and Tennessee,
to become more effective.216
III. EXISTING REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS ARE INADEQUATE
Many states have listened to the call of anti-trafficking organi-
zations and safe harbor advocates and created several remedies for
victims of human trafficking.217 While each state’s remedies vary
quite drastically, there are currently several limitations and proce-
dural hurdles that, in effect, render each inadequate. Even those that
exclusively seek to remedy a victim’s undeserved criminal history
fail to holistically protect victims. As the 2018 Trafficking In Persons
Report stated, “NGOs . . . noted a lack of sustained state and local
211. See id. at 36, 40.
212. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256K.45 (West 2015).
213. Weiss, supra note 192, at 17; see MINN. STAT. ANN. 260C.177 (West 2012).
214. Weiss, supra note 192, at 17; see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 739(a) (McKinney 2010).
215. Weiss, supra note 192, at 40; see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.4(3) (McKinney 2010).
This presumption means that
a minor under the age of sixteen who is arrested for prostitution is a victim
of a severe form of trafficking in persons under federal law and that the
minor will be treated as a child in need of services. However, if the minor
is a repeat offender or fails to cooperate with services provided, the minor
can still be prosecuted.
Dysart, supra note 96, at 277.
216. See Williams, supra note 172, at 9 (explaining the importance for states to have
both prosecutorial immunity and diversion programming for human trafficking victims).
217. See supra notes 211–16 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 219–49 and
accompanying text.
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government efforts to provide remedies for sex trafficking survivors
who had criminal records as a result of their exploitation.”218
A. Pretrial Diversion Programs
Generally, pretrial diversion programs are subject to the fulfill-
ment of certain conditions that make it difficult for victims to receive
immunity or services.219 In states that have adopted this tactic, victims
may still be charged with a crime before being diverted to a separate
proceeding at the discretion of the judge or prosecutor.220 Some di-
version programs require the admission of guilt or a conditional plea,
while others have enumerated several conditions, like cooperation
with law enforcement or first-time-offender requirements, that must
be met.221 If these requirements are not met and diversion efforts fail,
charges can be reinstated, and the victim may also be disqualified
from receiving the residual benefits of diversion, which can include
“safe housing, drug-rehabilitation services, therapy, and employment
training.”222 Moreover, pretrial diversion programs often lack fund-
ing, leaving victims with no real alternative other than relying on
the services provided through the criminal justice system.223
New York’s safe harbor law, for example, has four procedural
hurdles that a victim under the age of eighteen must overcome before
she can receive any benefits.224 There are four explicit reasons why
PINS certification can be denied to a trafficking victim over eighteen:
if she (1) is not a victim of “severe forms” of trafficking, (2) has a
prior conviction of prostitution, (3) had previously received PINS, or
(4) expressed unwillingness to cooperate with services.225 These
218. TIP REPORT 2018, supra note 171, at 444.
219. Patel, supra note 36, at 1558.
220. Id. at 1557.
221. Id.; see also Williams, supra note 172, at 5 (“[D]iversion contingent upon an ad-
mission of guilt, harms youth by treating them as an offender in the justice system rather
than as a survivor of trauma.”); NCSL, Human Trafficking State Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEG. (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/human-traf
ficking-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/F6SJ-W6B4].
222. Patel, supra note 36, at 1557. “For instance, in Massachusetts, should the minor
fail to comply with the state-sanctioned diversion programs, the charges against him/her
can be reinstated.” Id. at 1574.
223. Id. at 1559 (“Yet not all states that have enacted a pre-trial diversion program
mandate funding for the rehabilitative programs they provide . . . .”).
224. See Karen Wigle Weiss, A Review of the New York State Safe Harbor Law, ECPAT
1, 3–4 (2013). State statutes in general, but human trafficking safe harbor statutes in spe-
cific, contain several ambiguities and leave room for procedural hurdles. For a comprehen-
sive outline of the procedural hurdles of state expungement and vacatur laws, see Alice
Mutter, From Criminals to Survivors: Recognizing Domestic Sex Trafficking As Violence
Against Women in the District of Columbia, 26 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 593,
615 (2017).
225. Weiss, supra note 192, at 40; see also Krystle M. Fernandez, Victims or Criminals?
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restrictions severely inhibit the rehabilitation of victims in New York
because victims are often arrested by police for prostitution before
they are identified as trafficking victims.226 Consequently, victims
are often barred from receiving PINS certification, and obtaining the
benefits that follow, long before law enforcement realizes the person
is a victim and that certification as such is necessary.227 Further,
victims may lose certification because they fail to cooperate with au-
thority, a characteristic common among trafficking survivors.228 Any
one of these reasons leaves a victim without the benefit of services, or
at a minimum, with less opportunity to receive services, which ulti-
mately makes it more likely she will return to trafficking.229 Relying
solely on conditional pretrial diversion programs is insufficient.230
B. Affirmative Defenses and the Existing Rebuttable Presumption
Next, some states provide trafficking victims with an affirma-
tive defense of coercion against a criminal charge, while others have
created a rebuttable presumption of human trafficking victim in
limited circumstances, but both are meant to, in a sense, protect
survivors from further victimization.231 Unfortunately, the very nature
The Intricacies of Dealing with Juvenile Victims of Sex Trafficking and Why the Dis-
tinction Matters, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 859, 873 (2013).
226. Patel, supra note 36, at 1568 (“Usually, when victims are finally identified it is
not the first time they have been charged with prostitution. For example, in Colorado,
the 2014 Colorado Legislative Report on Human Trafficking found that 20% of trafficked
victims represented repeat victims and 40% of juveniles were rescued again as adults.”).
227. See generally Patel, supra note 36, at 1558.
228. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
229. Patel, supra note 36, at 1570 (“Though the frequency of recidivism may seem
peculiar to those who recognize these victims as victims of a crime, most of them have
been thoroughly pressured into a system that becomes familiar to them by the time they
are rescued.”).
230. See Mutter, supra note 224, at 595 (explaining that state legislatures which fail
to enact statutorily mandated diversion programs without unnecessary qualifications,
like D.C., “treats survivors as criminals and fails to provide them meaningful services”).
“Where law enforcement, lawyers, or judges fail to properly identify defendants as sur-
vivors, such survivors are not offered diversion services. Consequently, such statutes, while
necessary, require additional initiatives, such as improved training programs, to be prop-
erly accessible to survivors.” Id. at 609.
231. See Dysart, supra note 96, at 276 (providing the text of the relevant state statutes
dealing with affirmative defenses and explaining the differences between each); see, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-70-102(c), 103(c) (2013); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-6(c) (2015); IOWA CODE. § 710A.3 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6419(c) (2013);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:82(G)(1) (2017); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 57 (LexisNexis 2012);
MO. REV. STAT. § 566.223 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2 (LexisNexis 2018); OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.269 (2007); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-34.1-2(c) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3
-2020(F) (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-23-1.2 (2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d)
(West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9A.88.040 (LexisNexis 2012); see also Boggiani,
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of trafficking victims frequently renders these safe harbor provisions
difficult to assert or qualify for.232 Roughly thirty states allow traf-
ficking victims to be arrested, charged, and prosecuted, but offer vic-
tims an affirmative defense to the charge of prostitution.233 These
affirmative defenses are predictably difficult for victims to assert
and require “a set of facts that defeat[ ] or negate[ ] the legal conse-
quences of the defendant’s otherwise unlawful conduct of criminal
liability.”234 Moreover, for a victim to benefit from an affirmative de-
fense, she is required to assert the defense, and the case must reach
the trial phase of  prosecution.235 This is problematic because victims
do not typically self-identify, are placed with the burden of proof, and
often agree to plea deals soon after being charged.236 Some victims
are in relationships with their traffickers—making it “unlikely that
victims will intentionally incriminate the trafficker” or assert the de-
fense.237 Because victims typically come from vulnerable populations,
language or trauma barriers can be particularly challenging to over-
come and can, ultimately, make the victims less likely to cooperate
with law enforcement or their legal counsel.238 Thus, the affirmative
defense does not adequately protect victims.
supra note 5, at 953–60 (outlining the advantages and disadvantages of providing vic-
tims with an affirmative defense and expungement and/or vacatur laws).
232. See Isabella Blizard, Chapter 636: Catching Those Who Fall, an Affirmative
Defense for Human Trafficking Victims, 48 U. PAC. L. REV. 631, 644 (2017). Because the
survivor has recently left her traumatizing situation, deep psychological and emotional
issues may surface that could render her unable to explain the depth of her exploitation,
which could ultimately present “some difficulties in convincing the jury that she is a
trafficking victim.” See Boggiani, supra note 5, at 956.
233. Blizard, supra note 232, at 633; Wasch et al., supra note 173, at 2. For example,
New York allows survivors to use their victim status as an affirmative defense to a
prostitution charge. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.01 (McKinney 2018). In contrast, D.C.
does not provide victims with an affirmative defense at all. See D.C. Code Ann. § 22
-2701(a) (West 2016).
234. Wasch et al., supra note 173, at 2; see Boggiani, supra note 5, at 957 (“[A] recently
traumatized victim may not be able to express her sufferings in open court, or that the
affirmative defense is unlikely to be asserted given that the case is unlikely to be brought
to trial at all.”).
235. Boggiani, supra note 5, at 957. Reaching the trial phase of prosecution allows
victims to enter the justice system as criminals and is also highly unlikely considering
the frequency of plea bargains in obtaining convictions. See generally Lindsey Devers,
Research Summary: Plea and Charge Bargaining, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE 1, 1 (2011)
(“While there are no exact estimates of the proportion of cases that are resolved through
plea bargaining, scholars estimate that about 90 to 95 percent of both federal and state
court cases are resolved through this process.”).
236. Blizard, supra note 232, at 644 (“Victims of trafficking are unlike victims of other
crimes—they don’t actively seek to involve law enforcement due to their unique type of
trauma.”).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 634. Trafficking victims typically come from low socioeconomic backgrounds,
are uprooted from familiar locations, and have little education and low self-confidence
from years of abuse. Id. at 634–35.
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Some states also offer trafficking victims a rebuttable presump-
tion within the state’s affirmative defense provisions.239 In Connecti-
cut, for instance—unlike other states who provide complete immunity
for sexually exploited youth—children charged with prostitution are
presumed to be victims of sex trafficking, but this of course may be
rebutted with facts to the contrary.240 Current rebuttable presump-
tions can be highly beneficial in the context of an affirmative defense
for those who qualify, but for the same reasons why general affirma-
tive defense provisions do not effectively redress a victim’s criminaliza-
tion, they too unsuccessfully protect victims. Moreover, states have
limited the scope of these provisions so that only minors engaging in
prostitution can benefit from the presumption.241 For these reasons,
current rebuttable presumptions do not account for the adult traf-
ficking victim who participates in a wide variety of criminal conduct.
Even so, the shortcomings of the affirmative defense and current
rebuttable presumptions should not prevent states from providing vic-
tims with these tools; they should, however, urge states to search for
better, more definitive solutions. There is an obvious advantage of
early intervention when it comes to affirmative defenses as compared
to reactionary remedies, such as expungement or vacatur laws.242
C. Expungement and Vacatur Laws
Until now, states which sought to address the victim-perpetrator
dilemma and recognize non-criminalization of victims focused their
efforts on enacting expungement and vacatur laws.243 However, these
239. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-82(b) (West 2016); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 311.4
(McKinney 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1029 (West 2013).
240. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-82 (West 2016); Etienne, supra note 57, at 51.
For example, to rebut the presumption of victim, a prosecutor in Connecticut may provide
evidence that there was no third-party profiting (i.e., a pimp) from the child’s conduct,
or that the john bought directly from the child. See CONN. GEN. STA. ANN. § 53a-82 (West
2016). New York also has a rebuttable presumption, which is again limited to minors
under the age of sixteen. See N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 311.4 (McKinney 2010). Additionally,
Oklahoma provides sixteen to seventeen-year-old victims who are being prosecuted for
prostitution the presumption that “the actor was coerced into committing such offense
by another person in violation of the human trafficking provisions . . . .” See OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1029 (West 2013).
241. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-82 (West 2016); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 311.4
(McKinney 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1029 (West 2013).
242. Emerson & Aminzadeh, supra note 135, at 257 (discussing the subsequent damage
victims bear after conviction).
243. See, e.g., Trafficking Survivors Relief Act of 2017, S. 104, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.
459, 115th Cong. (2017).
The terms “expungement” and “vacatur” may seem interchangeable, but in
practice, the terms provide two very different types of relief. While expunge-
ment means “to erase,” vacatur means “to null or cancel.” Vacatur is effective
in certain contexts as it removes the legal consequences of conviction, but
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laws have hidden procedural hurdles and do not safeguard victims
from initially being criminalized.244 Currently, “39 states ha[ve]
vacatur laws allowing survivors to seek a court order vacating or
expunging criminal convictions entered against them that resulted
from their trafficking situation.”245 The rationale for enacting expunge-
ment laws is the same as that for adopting a rebuttable presumption
of coercion: to protect trafficking victims from the long-term obstacles
of a criminal history for crimes with which they should not have been
charged or convicted.246 Expungement opportunities afford victims a
much-needed avenue for clearing their criminal history after they
endure the criminal justice system as a perpetrator.247 Rebuttable
presumptions, on the other hand, address the victim-perpetrator
dilemma at an earlier stage before a victim faces the psychological
and criminal consequences of being convicted.
It is necessary that victims retain the ability to file motions to
expunge or vacate their prior convictions and arrests but relying on
these mechanisms comes too late.248 Expungement provisions in their
the record of the charge still exists. Expungement, on the contrary, requires
“the physical destruction of information.” In other words, a vacated conviction
will still appear on a criminal record as vacated, but an expunged conviction
will not appear on a criminal record at all.
Meiers, supra note 11, at 219–20.
244. See Augustson, supra note 14, at 639; Mutter, supra note 224, at 599–600 (discus-
sing vacatur statutes and their effectiveness in clearing victims’ criminal records). Al-
though there is currently no federal expungement or vacatur laws, Congress—through
the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015—has incentivized states “to pass laws
that allow trafficking victims to petition courts to expunge arrest and conviction records
for non-violent offenses committed as a direct result of being trafficked.” Ann Wagner &
Rachel Wagley McCann, Prostitutes or Prey? The Evolution of Congressional Intent in
Combating Sex Trafficking, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 17, 64 (2017); see also Justice for Victims
of Trafficking Act, S. 178, 114th Cong. § 1002 (2015); Emerson & Aminzadeh, supra note
135, at 252.
245. TIP REPORT 2018, supra note 171, at 444; see Survivor Reentry Project, Post-
Conviction Advocacy for Survivors of Human Trafficking: A Guide for Attorneys, AM. B.
ASS’N (Apr. 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/domestic_violence/survivor-re
entry-project [https://perma.cc/6V4L-LJ39].
246. See generally Emerson & Aminzadeh, supra note 135, at 257 (“Once criminalized,
victims then bear the additional burden of the stigma and collateral harms that come with
a criminal record. Frequently, this results in recidivism, continued exploitation, or the
chronic instability that comes with an inability to heal from trauma.”).
247. See Boggiani, supra note 5, at 960.
248. See Bouche et al., supra note 182, at 5. For example, during the course of her
trafficking, a victim
picked up 12 convictions on her record. . . . Since this incident, CAST has
helped to get 11 out of 12 of her cases dismissed, yet still has one more con-
viction that a courthouse refuses to dismiss because of unpaid court fees. Ava
also has a wage garnishment attached to each paycheck she receives because
of unpaid court fees. These lingering reminders of her past make it painstak-
ingly difficult for Ava to get a higher-than-minimum-wage job, to provide for
her son, and to move on.
Richard, supra note 16, at 13.
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very nature serve as “last-resort legal safety net[s] to trafficking
victims trapped in the double victimization cycle.”249 With this in
mind, states must tackle the criminalization of victims at its origin,
focusing their efforts on victim identification and informed prosecuto-
rial discretion. That way, victims may avoid criminal charges alto-
gether for crimes committed as a direct result of their victimization.250
Withholding the remedy for clearing a victim’s offenses committed
as a result of her trafficking until after she collects a lengthy crimi-
nal history can create prolonged psychological consequences and
barriers to recovery.251 For example, it may be difficult for a victim
to ensure that all her convictions are cleared because, depending on
the state, only certain types of offenses may qualify for expungement
or there may be a timeliness requirement, a burdensome documen-
tation requirement, or a requirement that a victim demonstrate that
she has made efforts toward rehabilitation.252
Because trafficking victims often commit crimes in multiple ju-
risdictions, it also becomes burdensome for victims to spend the money
and time to go to each jurisdiction and petition each conviction—this
is true even when we assume the victim has enough resources to se-
cure a lawyer on her behalf.253 The reality is that “[a]n individual must
file a separate petition for each arrest and the individual must pay
an additional filing fee for each petition filed.”254 It is also common
for discrepancies to exist between documents meant to track an
249. See Boggiani, supra note 5, at 960.
250. See 22 U.S.C.S. § 7101(b)(24) (2012). “Indeed, it is undeniable that being trafficked,
coerced into prostitution, arrested, and convicted are terrible experiences and [expunge-
ment statutes] would only serve the limited purpose of erasing the legal consequences
of the last and least meaningful part of the [trafficking experience].” Boggiani, supra
note 5, at 960.
251. See Boggiani, supra note 5, at 960.
252. See Bouche et al., supra note 182, at 12–13, 19. “Of the existing state vacatur
statutes, there are variations on the types of convictions that defendants may vacate,
how long after a defendant can vacate, and documentation requirements for proving that
a defendant has left the commercial sex industry.” Mutter, supra note 224, at 614–15.
“Many states also include additional stipulations regarding burden of proof, demonstra-
tion of rehabilitation, . . . [s]till other statutes have completely unique requirements . . . .”
Meiers, supra note 11, at 218–19.
253. See Bouche et al., supra note 182, at 12–13, 19. A victim may also need to secure
multiple lawyers, as the lawyer may have to be licensed in the relevant state. Often times,
the costs associated with petitioning a court for expungement is well outside a victim’s
means, in terms of both money and time. See, e.g., Hancock, supra note 21, at 528 (explain-
ing that “[e]xpungement costs between $450 and $2,000 in Philadelphia, including $15.00
per petition for expungement and $12.50 per petition for redaction,” and noting that “[b]e-
yond the costs associated with expungement, the process can take up to a year.”). Moreover,
“[t]he limits that some states place on the type of convictions that defendants may vacate
and the time span where defendants may file a motion for vacatur often prevent
survivors of sex trafficking from cleaning their record.” Mutter, supra note 224, at 615.
254. See Hancock, supra note 21, at 528.
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individual’s criminal history, such as FBI Live Scans, a particular
state’s Department of Justice rap sheet, and the lower court’s minute
orders from the county in which the offense took place.255 Discrepan-
cies among these documents can consume a lawyer’s time and ulti-
mately burden the preliminary step of simply compiling a survivor’s
criminal history. Finally, expungement laws are inadequate because
a portion of victims are left unaware that they may qualify for benefi-
cial remedies.256
While expungement and vacatur laws may not be the ideal
instruments for preventing revictimization, similar to affirmative
defenses and existing rebuttable presumptions, they do serve valu-
able functions by relieving victims of obstacles to rehabilitation.257
Clearing a victim’s criminal history will never erase the trauma of a
victim’s past; but it will, to some degree, ensure that a victim’s wrong-
ful prosecution will no longer inhibit the journey forward on her
road to recovery.
IV. CREATING A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF
COERCION FOR VICTIMS
With the guidance of a revised federal Model Law, states should
adopt broad safe harbor provisions that seek to protect victims of
human trafficking from the lingering effects of their coercion.258 This
Part will address the necessity for expanded safe harbor statutes.
Section A outlines the call for a rebuttable presumption that extends
to all non-violent crimes—encompassing non-prostitution-related
offenses—and explains the contours and policy considerations of
such a provision.259 Section B discusses the need for consistent and
comprehensive state action,260 and lastly, Section C raises the argu-
ments against protecting victims from prosecution and rebuts the
most common misconceptions.261
255. Interview with Tanya Cooper, Associate Professor, Pepperdine University School
of Law, in Malibu, Cal. (Oct. 12, 2018). Tanya Cooper teaches Pepperdine’s Restoration
and Justice clinic, which, among other legal services, assists human trafficking survivors
compile their criminal history and file vacatur petitions in California courts to relieve
the burden of a criminal history.
256. See Kessler, supra note 88, at 429. “Expungement is generally inaccessible due
to strict statutes, limited inherent judicial authority, and record holders’ lack of knowl-
edge regarding access to and eligibility for expungement.” Id.
257. Id. at 408.
258. See supra Section II.B.
259. See infra Section IV.A.
260. See infra Section IV.B.
261. See infra Section IV.C.
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A. The Rebuttable Presumption That Any Non-violent Offense
Committed by a Victim During Trafficking Is a Result Thereof
The creation of a rebuttable presumption of coercion for traffick-
ing victims will inevitably affect the victim-identification process; a
process that is extremely fact-sensitive, where reasonable, well-
informed minds may disagree, and one that requires patience.262 It
is truly difficult for law enforcement officers to identify which crimes
were committed as a result of coercion and which individuals are
victims in unclear situations. Therefore, states should heavily
consider the advantages of enacting a provision into their existing
safe harbor laws, detailing that any non-violent criminal offense
committed by a victim of human trafficking during the course of his
or her trafficking is presumptively a product of coercion and therefore
non-prosecutable.263
This provision goes beyond the presumption of innocence be-
cause it would characterize victims as more than simply innocent.264
It would presumptively label those exploited by human traffickers
as victims and confer a presumption of coercion, even when the
prosecutor is able to prove that a victim knowingly engaged in crimi-
nal conduct.265 Of course, a prosecutor can attempt to rebut this
262. See Zeeman & Stauss, supra note 2, at 147 (recognizing that “even experienced
agents and prosecutors who are alert to trauma responses and are deeply committed to
pursuing justice on behalf of vulnerable victims may reach differing conclusions in
analyzing and balancing the multiple complex considerations relevant to assessing a
victim-perpetrator’s criminal liability”).
263. See id. at 140 (“[V]ictims should rarely, if ever, be charged with non-violent, victim-
less offenses that are entirely a product of the trafficking, such as prostitution offenses
committed at the trafficker’s direction. Prosecuting such offenses serves no deterrent pur-
pose and only amplifies the severe harm suffered from the initial victimization. This type
of prosecution will only further alienate the victim, increasing her risk of re-victimiza-
tion. Similarly, it would not serve the interest of justice to prosecute a labor trafficking
victim for an immigration-related offense that the trafficker facilitated in furtherance
of the coerced labor scheme.”).
264. A rebuttable presumption, by definition, is
[a] legal inference or assumption that a fact exists because of the known or
proven existence of some other fact or group of facts. Most presumptions are
rules of evidence calling for a certain result in a given case unless the ad-
versely affected party overcomes it with other evidence. A presumption shifts
the burden of production or persuasion to the opposing party, who can then
attempt to overcome the presumption.
Presumption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
265. Human trafficking victims are in unique positions, because in “other criminal
contexts, previous trauma and victimizations may be considered mitigating factors, but
typically would not foreclose federal prosecution in itself, as is the case when a child
pornography perpetrator has previously been sexually abused.” See Zeeman & Stauss,
supra note 2, at 146.
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presumption with evidence that the conduct was not the result of
coercion.266 It is important to note that “not all crimes committed by
trafficking victims are [a] result of trauma, force, or coercion.”267 But
because trafficking victims have suffered extreme trauma, often fail
to self-identify, tell incoherent stories, can refuse to testify, and
have troubling pasts, placing the initial burden on them to prove
coercion as a defense adds another problematic hurdle for victims to
overcome before receiving services.268 The fact that the presumption
of coercion need not be asserted allows the victim to immediately
benefit from its effect upon being identified.269
Some may argue that the creation of a new rebuttable presump-
tion will be too strenuous for prosecutors to overcome. This argument,
however, fails to acknowledge that our criminal justice system,
through varying levels of burdens of proof and the existing presump-
tion of innocence, already recognizes the importance of protecting
victims from being wrongfully convicted and weighs that interest
above that of the prosecutor. While the role of prosecutors must be
considered, it should not outweigh the liberty interest of victims. In
fact, the victim’s well-being should be of the utmost importance.
Other anti-trafficking advocates argue that providing absolute
immunity to victims for crimes that were committed as a direct re-
sult of trafficking is the proper avenue to protect victims from further
criminalization. If there were clear distinctions between “victim”
and “perpetrator,” this would be an excellent remedy. However, as
discussed earlier, the line between victim and perpetrator is often
indistinguishable, and completely foreclosing the possibility of holding
victims criminally liable for engaging in criminal conduct when it
was in no way a product of coercion would not serve the interest of
justice. Ultimately, with the increased enactment of state expunge-
ment and vacatur laws, states have obviously begun to understand
the need to protect victims from unnecessary criminalization. The
266. Interestingly, the presumption of coercion may require the victim to admit to en-
gaging in the criminal conduct in question. In other words, if a victim introduces evidence
that the charged conduct occurred while she was a victim of trafficking, she will inherently
admit to the act. Therefore, while the prosecutor must still overcome a difficult causation
issue (i.e., whether the conduct was a direct result of trafficking), the prosecutor no longer
has to prove the victim-defendant engaged in the criminal conduct.
267. Id. at 145 (“[I]mmigration-related crimes or violations may precede the onset of
coercion and abusive control. Sex trafficking victims may initially consent to engage in
commercial sex, in violation of state laws, and may have committed drug-related crimes
before the abuse and control began.”).
268. See Boggiani, supra note 5, at 916.
269. See Peters, supra note 151, at 25 (recognizing that “citizen victims must be viewed
as crime victims worthy of receiving protection,” and that “[b]efore a person can qualify
as a victim of human trafficking, he or she must be identified as one”).
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rationale for these laws also supports the creation of a new pre-
sumption of coercion: to protect trafficking victims from the long-term
obstacles of a criminal history for crimes of which they should not
have been convicted.270
The “non-violent” portion of the rebuttable presumption provision
is crucial. First, it ensures that states balance the level of potential
harm the victim posed to a third party while committing her criminal
offense; and second, it recognizes the wide variety of crimes that a
victim can commit during the course of her trafficking. When vic-
tims engage in violent criminal conduct, the analysis becomes even
more convoluted because the interests of a third party must also be
considered.271 With this in mind, providing an immediate rebuttable
presumption to victims who commit violent crimes would not serve
in the interest of justice and prosecutorial discretion becomes the
key, not legislative solutions. Understandably, victims can commit
violent crimes under the coercion of their trafficker, but these crimes
do not warrant the presumption of coercion due to their violent na-
ture. For instance, in situations where a victim becomes a Bottom
and engages in violent activity similar to trafficking, rather than
providing her a presumption of coercion, survivor-based diversion
programming may “permit [her] to move through the judicial system
with as little re-traumatization as possible.”272
The “non-violent” portion is also consistent with most anti-
trafficking scholars, who support that “a broad statute, offering relief
for offenses other than prostitution, would best serve the victim.”273
Given the variations in traffickers’ coercive schemes, it is important
to understand that human trafficking is more than prostitution-
related crimes and more than sex trafficking.274 This fact is under-
scored by the CAST study on the arrest frequency of victims during
their trafficking and the diversity of those crimes. For this reason,
it is vital that the rebuttable presumption extend to all non-violent
270. See Boggiani, supra note 5, at 916.
271. See Zeeman & Stauss, supra note 2, at 145 (“Deciding whether the interest of
justice favors holding an individual accountable for severe criminal conduct arising from
her own victimization requires a nuanced, case-by-case, fact-specific analysis involving
consideration of the totality of the trafficking victim’s actions, intent and personal cir-
cumstances, as well as the impact of her conduct on others.”).
272. Mutter, supra note 224, at 618.
273. Meiers, supra note 11, at 229. “The distinction between non-violent and violent
offenses, however, can limit the relief available to the victim because it is possible for a
violent crime to result from victimization.” Id. at 229–30. In fact, the scope of what crimes
fall within the term “non-violent” has been the subject of debate among federal courts
in the realm of sentencing law. See Shelby Burns, The Johnson & Johnson Problem: The
Supreme Court Limited the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “Violent Felony” Provision—
And Our Children Are Paying, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 785, 809 (2018).
274. See Richard, supra note 16, at 7–8.
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crimes a victim commits as a result of her trafficking, not just pros-
titution or prostitution-related offenses.275
Technically, rebuttable presumptions do not generally shield
victims from prosecution, and a prosecutor can still go forward with
evidence of the offense or of how the criminal conduct was not a
result of trafficking.276 Thus, the rebuttable presumption of coercion
will not, on its face, protect victims from prosecution; it will, however,
make victims less likely of being convicted inappropriately—and
also effectively make victims less likely to be prosecuted in cases
where prosecutors are less confident they can overcome the pre-
sumption of coercion. Therefore, while it may not overtly prohibit
prosecution, the presumption of coercion will likely have the practi-
cal effect of shielding victims from unnecessary prosecution.
Because the presumption of coercion attaches during the trial
phase of prosecution—therefore, inherently allowing victims to still
be arrested and charged—it is imperative that states which enact
this proposed provision also include language which allows for
vacatur relief of the arrests and charges at issue in the litigation if
the presumption of coercion is not rebutted. That way, victims will
no longer be burdened by the weight of an unnecessary criminal
history. Statutory language of this kind (i.e., that allow for arrests
and charges to be cleared upon identifying a victim of human traf-
ficking) are not novel because current vacatur and expungement
laws provide similar relief.
In California, for example, upon filing a petition with the court
alleging that the non-violent offense occurred during the course of
a victim’s trafficking and was the product of coercion, the arrests,
charges, and convictions relating to the offenses may be wiped clean.277
A similar mechanism within the presumption of coercion is not only
easily integrated, but it is crucial for this proposed solution to
holistically deal with a survivor’s victimization. Moreover, allowing
the judge to immediately vacate or expunge the arrests and charges
for the crimes at issue in the case is efficient and will save judicial
resources. If allowed, a victim’s rehabilitation efforts may begin all
275. See Meiers, supra note 11, at 230 (“To be successful, the statute must be as in-
clusive as possible to encompass the wide variety of offenses victims are compelled to
commit as a result of their victimization.”).
276. In situations where a prosecutor is able to rebut the presumption of coercion and
offer evidence that the victim had the requisite criminal intent to commit the crime, the
victim in that instance should still be able to file a vacatur petition following the trial.
This is because victims should not be barred from the benefits of vacatur and expunge-
ments laws by the addition of a new remedy. This would provide survivors with an equi-
table amount of latitude to bring their case.
277. CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.14 (West 2017).
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at once, instead of her having to retain another attorney and begin
the vacatur process for the arrests and charges for a crime that has
already been presumptively deemed a product of coercion.
It is true that even with a rebuttable presumption on the front
end of a victim’s encounter with the criminal justice system, some
victims will fail to be identified as victims, and as a result will con-
tinue to be punished for crimes they were forced to commit. There-
fore, this single solution will not in itself cure the victim-perpetrator
dilemma, nor will it alone successfully end human trafficking. But it
will provide identified victims with a helpful mechanism that sends
victims through rehabilitative services rather than through prosecu-
tion. It is necessary that our justice system views a victim through
a lens that presumptively recognizes both her victimhood and the
extent of the coercion she likely endured.
B. Why Consistent and Comprehensive State Action Is Necessary
Creating a rebuttable presumption for victims through state-
level safe harbor laws is the most effective avenue to address the
narrow scope of current safe harbor laws.278 This is true despite the
plausibility of also creating the presumption at the federal level, which
would arguably discourage states from prosecuting human trafficking
victims without first addressing the victim-perpetrator dilemma.279
While the Thirteenth Amendment certainly empowers the federal
government to combat human trafficking, “it is inconceivable to
think that the federal government is best situated to eradicate traf-
ficking in the United States.”280 Federal prosecutors are limited in
their resources and as a result are not equipped to deal with the
growing number of human trafficking cases.281 State and local gov-
ernments are better situated to prosecute traffickers and protect
victims because they encounter victims more often than federal
officers.282 Therefore, state-regulated safe harbor laws which grant
278. Dysart, supra note 96, at 273. The U.S. Department of State recognizes this
notion, as the 2018 TIP Report affirms that “[s]tate laws form the basis of most criminal
actions in the United States.” TIP REPORT 2018, supra note 171, at 444.
279. See Dysart, supra note 96, at 273 (“The Supreme Court recognized in Keller v.
United States that ‘[j]urisdiction over [the offense of keeping a house of ill-fame] comes
within the accepted definition of the police power. Speaking generally, that power is re-
served to the states, for there is in the Constitution no grant thereof to Congress.’ ”); see
also Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 144 (1909).
280. Dysart, supra note 96, at 273.
281. Id. at 274.
282. Id.; see also Tanagho, supra note 164, at 918–19 (“[F]ederal resources alone are
inadequate[,] . . . federal prosecutors are unlikely to take smaller cases, and state laws
can address the local population’s unique needs.”). For this reason, many non-profits and
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victims a presumption of coercion should be the avenue state legisla-
tors and advocates focus on.283
More importantly, the victim-perpetrator dilemma must be ad-
dressed through the enactment of positive law, not through judicially
created provisions.284 While prosecutorial discretion and successful
victim identification efforts play a vital role in the prosecution of
human trafficking, state legislatures can better support victims by
also adding an explicit rebuttable presumption provision.
In addition to calling on states legislatures, this Comment pro-
poses that the United States Department of Justice can also play a
role in guiding states in the proper direction. To support the expan-
sion of well-drafted safe harbor statutes, federal, state, and local
governments must work together to address this issue.285 Ultimately,
safe harbor laws can be effectively drafted by state legislatures with
the help of an updated federal Model Law; one that encourages
states to enact new rebuttable presumption of coercion provisions.
Currently, federal Model Law is silent on the issue of prosecutorial
immunity for crimes other than prostitution and has no rebuttable
presumption provision.286
The use of financial incentives to create state task forces and
“combat sex trafficking of minors” under the reauthorizations of the
TVPA and guidance from the Model Law, along with other sources
of influence, have proven effective; they encouraged states to enact
general safe harbor provisions and states listened by enacting these
provisions.287 For example, a “recent reauthorization of the TVPA con-
tained a section amending a grant program in the TVPRA 2005 to
provide grants to state or local governments to ‘combat sex traffick-
ing of minors.’”288 Therefore, providing explicit presumption of coer-
cion provisions in federal Model Law would be an effective avenue
for helping state legislatures draft similar provisions.
advocacy organizations push for legislation at the state level, rather than through federal
legislation. See Dysart, supra note 96, at 274.
283. Dysart, supra note 96, at 274.
284. Id. at 286. A judicially created provision would be one the court creates that is not
explicitly stated in a particular statute, but derived from the statute’s purpose and
language. Id. (“One of the benefits of a positive-law immunity provision, as opposed to
a judicially created provision, is that the legislature can better consider the legal and
policy issues on both sides of the argument and craft a solution that best balances the
countervailing concerns.”).
285. Id. at 273 (“In fact, the federal government in the TVPA and its reauthorizations
‘envisioned a role for state and local governments to prosecute sex traffickers and restore
victims.’ ”).
286. See generally Model Law, supra note 162.
287. Dysart, supra note 96, at 273.
288. Id.; see also Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No.
113-4, 127 Stat. 54, 149–53 (2013).
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Because federal Model Law is not enacted legislation, including
a presumption of coercion within it would have no legal consequences
and would come at little expense to the federal government. It would
only serve the purpose of providing best practices for safe harbor
statutes at the state level.289 States need a Model Law to look to for
guidance to draft effective provisions that are consistent with the
congressional intent of protecting human trafficking victims from
inappropriate incarceration.290 If updated, the Model Law could help
create a much-needed consistency among each state’s safe harbor
laws, ensuring that victims of human trafficking are protected equally
among the states.291
C. Arguments Against Safe Harbor Statutes That Excuse a
Victim’s Criminal Liability
There are several arguments against implementing a safe harbor
provision that grants victims a rebuttable presumption of coer-
cion.292 Admittedly, the idea of not prosecuting individuals for the
“crimes” they commit is fairly controversial when viewed through an
isolated lens.293 In this Section, this Comment will explain the likely
arguments against creating a rebuttable presumption of coercion.294
These objections, however, ultimately lack merit and fail to recog-
nize the policy implications behind protecting victims from coercion
and unnecessary criminalization.
1. Misconception: Arresting Victims Is the Only Effective Way
to Get Them Off the Street and into Services
One of the most common misconceptions regarding human
trafficking is the argument that the best avenue to get victims into
services is to increase prosecution efforts and arrest them.295 It is
289. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
290. See generally Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1347–48
(11th Cir. 2011) (outlining congressional intent of the TVPA).
291. See Tanagho, supra note 164, at 939; see also Wagner & McCann, supra note 244,
at 93 (“States play a central role in combating trafficking. Many sex trafficking victims
are identified locally, often by police patrol officers . . . .”).
292. See Dysart, supra note 96, at 279.
293. See Etienne, supra note 57, at 76.
294. See supra notes 262–83 and accompanying text.
295. Etienne, supra note 57, at 76; see also Emerson & Aminzadeh, supra note 135,
at 245–46 (“Law enforcement raids, long seen as the primary vehicles for identification
and recovery of trafficking victims, are more often deemed successful ‘by the collection of
evidence . . . [and] witnesses who may testify in prosecution of [trafficking] crimes,’ than
by the identification and support of victims. Instead, victims commonly find themselves
arrested or detained, either because victims are not screened for trafficking by law
enforcement, or because they fail to identify themselves as victims.”).
2019] THE “VICTIM-PERPETRATOR” DILEMMA 601
believed that once a victim is arrested, she can finally be placed into
social services and while under the control of the government, will
get the support she needs.296 Especially for trafficked youth, this
rationale often comes from law enforcement, prosecutors, and juve-
nile judges who argue that, “ ‘because strategies of persuasion and
common sense have failed with these youth, it is necessary to place
them in secure custody for their own protection,’ both to keep them
from running back to their pimps and to ensure that they receive
the services they need.”297
Unfortunately, however, this well-intentioned rationale criminal-
izes victims of human trafficking.298 It provides a disservice to victims
because law enforcement officers end up treating victims similar to
how they treat the victims’ trafficker.299 This treatment can confirm
the lies that traffickers frequently tell their victims about their own
culpability and increase a victim’s distrust for law enforcement300—
perpetuating the cycle of trafficking victims returning to “the Life.”
Moreover, the need for victims to receive access to social services
does not justify criminalizing them.301 The focus must shift away
from the arrest and prosecution of victims and concentrate on less
traumatic victim-identification techniques and creating a presump-
tion of coercion.302
2. Misconception: Law Enforcement Need the Threat of
Prosecution for Victims to Cooperate
Others believe that if victims are granted immunity for the crimes
they commit and “do not face the threat of prosecution and imprison-
ment,” then victims will not “cooperate with the prosecution of their
296. See Dysart, supra note 96, at 281.
297. Id.
298. See id.
299. See Tamar R. Birckhead, The “Youngest Profession”: Consent, Autonomy, and
Prostituted Children, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1085–86 (2011) (“Yet, the justification
of detention in the name of protection is less compelling when the penalty includes such
negative consequences as a permanent criminal record or imprisonment with adult
offenders . . . .”). According to the Sex Workers Project at the Urban Justice Center, 27%
of sex workers have been subjected to violent behavior from law enforcement officers. See
Revolving Door, supra note 56. Further, a Washington, D.C. study estimated that “50%
of sex workers who turned to law enforcement officials for assistance were ignored or
experienced abuse at the hands of police officers.” See Patel, supra note 36, at 1562.
300. See Balmgamwalla, supra note 4, at 35 (“The policy of arresting individuals in the
interest of their own welfare also suggests that benefits cannot be given outside the
criminal justice system, although there are a number of programs that seek to deliver
their services independently of criminal justice proceedings.”).
301. Dysart, supra note 96, at 281.
302. Id. at 282 (“[A]s the Texas Supreme Court pointed out in In re B.W., the juvenile
justice system is not the ‘only portal’ for prostituted children to receive needed social
services.”); see generally In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818 (Tex. 2010).
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[traffickers] by testifying against them.”303 This misconception is prem-
ised on the idea that “[b]ecause [a victim’s] testimony is often neces-
sary to successfully prosecute those who exploit them, . . . the mere
threat of prosecution and the subsequent ability to detain [victims] is
the most effective way to obtain their important testimony.”304
While it is known that victims are unlikely to cooperate with
law enforcement—often a direct result of trauma, including trauma-
bonding with their trafficker, inability to self-identify as a victim, or
apprehension of authority—this argument is misplaced.305 Using the
threat of prosecution is uncomfortably similar to the coercion that
victims have already experienced under their trafficker. A traffick-
ing survivor’s status as a victim should not depend on her initial
hesitation, or ultimate refusal, to cooperate with law enforcement.306
Moreover, “[c]onditioning treatment and services upon requirements
only exacerbate[s] victims’ trauma and tendency to be uncooperative.
Thus, the victims’ behavior, not the perpetrators’, dictates whether the
victims receive immunity for actions they were coerced into commit-
ting.”307 Prosecutors do not need to threaten survivors into cooperat-
ing.308 In reality, trafficking victims may be more likely to cooperate
with law enforcement if they are first relieved of the fear of prosecu-
tion and met with a presumption of coercion.309
303. Dysart, supra note 96, at 280.
304. Megan Annitto, Consent, Coercion, and Compassion: Emerging Legal Responses to
the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 27–28 (2010).
305. Dysart, supra note 96, at 280–81.
306. See NSN Members Survey, supra note 111, at 6 (detailing survivors’ responses to
the survey, which include: “I was given a mandate that I must testify against my traf-
ficker. I was unable, so I was charged”; “I was sentenced to 30 months in prison because
I would not testify against my trafficker”; and “I was scared they told me if I didn’t tell
they would keep arresting me[sic] & keep me in jail for a very long time”). In the end, very
few survivors testify against their trafficker in court and they are ordinarily not ideal
witnesses due to their troubled past. See Balmgamwalla, supra note 4, at 27 (“As witnesses,
trafficking victims may refer to choices such as travelling abroad, knowingly accepting
sex work, keeping false passports, and deciding to make money, all of which might under-
mine their credibility in court.”). Additionally, many of the cases against the trafficker
are dismissed “when witnesses fail to testify, mainly as a result of witness intimidation.”
Kessler, supra note 88, at 442.
307. Patel, supra note 36, at 1574 (emphasis added). “Unfortunately, state safe-harbor
statutes do offer referrals to service providers or actual rehabilitative services but
condition it upon cooperation with law enforcement officers who they have been taught
to fear or other such requirements.” Id.
308. See Dysart, supra note 96, at 280; see also Annitto, supra note 304, at 28 (“[I]t is
easier for law enforcement personnel to build a relationship of trust with children when
they are not at risk of prosecution.”).
309. See Dysart, supra note 96, at 280. However, in the event that victims are unwil-
ling or unable to testify against their trafficker in court, prosecutors may have sufficient
evidence to prove each element. See Alessandra P. Serano, Evidence Considerations in
Proving Sex Trafficking Cases Without a Testifying Victim, 65 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 115,
116–21 (2017).
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3. Misconception: The Victim Freely Entered Prostitution and
Should Be Punished, Not Excused from Liability
Another argument against creating a rebuttable presumption
of coercion is that some victims are not victims at all because they
freely enter prostitution and should be punished as a result.310 This
Comment does not argue for the decriminalization of prostitution,
but it is important to note that a victim’s sexual history may seem
relevant and that some individuals freely enter prostitution.311 In
fact, the history of sex trafficking victims often brings to light pre-
vious instances of voluntary prostitution or engagement in commer-
cial sex acts.312 These facts alone, however, do not mean that the
victim has foregone her ability to deny consent to engaging in prosti-
tution in the future.313 Thus, if she is trafficked, she should also
benefit from the presumption of coercion.314
This misconception is based on an erroneous analysis and seri-
ously “underestimate[s] the reality of coercion in this industry.”315
For example, “[i]t is not assumed that because someone voluntarily
worked on a farm, picking tomatoes last year that they cannot be co-
erced to work on a different farm this year.”316 Thus, a victim’s prior
employment in the sex industry should not lead to an immediate
abandonment of a case; it should lead to better identification tech-
niques.317 There must be a focus on victim identification and law
enforcement training, not on the previous sexual history of potential
victims.318 Otherwise, the line between criminal and victim will
continue to remain blurry, or worse, non-existent.319 As John Cotton
310. See Dysart, supra note 96, at 286.
311. Id. at 287.
312. See Richmond, Root Cause, supra note 7, at 2.
313. Id. at 1, 2; see, e.g., United States v. Cephus, 684 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“[E]ven if [the victim] knew going in, from her prior experience, that [the trafficker]
probably would beat her, it was still a crime for him to do so. And finally[,] the fact that
[the victim had] been a prostitute before does not suggest that he didn’t beat and threaten
her—that was his modus operandi . . . .”).
314. Dysart, supra note 96, at 287. Although some sex trafficking victims may initially
“consent” to being prostituted—sometimes “out of misplaced loyalty to an organization
or a desire to be part of the family structure[ ]”—when victims desire to stop, “gangs
usually increase their use of fraud, threats, and coercion to keep victims submitting to
commercial sex acts.” See G. Zachary Terwilliger et al., Human Trafficking and Organized
Crime: Combating Trafficking Perpetrated by Gangs, Enterprises, and Criminal Organiza-
tions, 65 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 123, 129 (2017).
315. Dysart, supra note 96, at 287.
316. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 36.
317. See Heather J. Clawson & Nicole Dutch, Identifying Victims of Human Trafficking:
Inherent Challenges and Promising Strategies from the Field, U.S. DEP’T  HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS. 1, 2–3 (2008), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/75321/ib.pdf.
318. See id.
319. See id.
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Richmond, a former federal prosecutor in the United States Depart-
ment of Justice’s Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit and the current
U.S. Department of State’s Ambassador for Trafficking in Persons,
stated: “Self-inflicted problems and messy lives are attractive to
traffickers when they are recruiting their victims; these conditions
should not also be barriers to the rescue and restoration of victims.”320
In sum, each misconception fails to account for the need to pro-
tect trafficking victims from coercion and unnecessary criminalization,
and therefore should not deter states from creating a rebuttable pre-
sumption of coercion.
CONCLUSION
When states fail to prioritize efforts to understand the victim-
perpetrator dilemma, human trafficking survivors suffer devastating
consequences.321 Despite having already endured severe trauma and
exploitation, survivors are frequently criminalized for crimes they
were forced to commit by their trafficker.322 The extent of states’ re-
sponse has led to several reactionary remedies that are difficult to
assert, contain numerous burdensome eligibility requirements, and
are only available once a victim has been convicted of a crime.323
A new rebuttable presumption of coercion is desperately
needed.324 The Department of Justice should draft a new Model Law
with an expanded safe harbor provision that encourages the cre-
ation of a presumption of coercion to protect victims from conviction
for the wide variety of crimes they were forced to commit.325 This
will give states a clearer guideline for anti-human trafficking stat-
utes and empower states to not only criminalize human trafficking
but decriminalize the victims.326 For safe harbor laws to fully address
the needs of survivors, there must be state consistency in prevention
and punishment.327 Unfortunately, our collective decriminalization
efforts fail when we do not protect victims from the full extent of a
trafficker’s coercion.328 The longer the effects of this coercion linger,
320. Richmond, Human Trafficking, supra note 22, at 37.
321. See Emerson & Aminzadeh, supra note 135, at 245–46.
322. See supra Section I.B.2.
323. See supra Part III.
324. See supra Part IV.
325. See Tanagho, supra note 164, at 899.
326. See supra Section IV.B.
327. See Tanagho, supra note 164, at 919. Otherwise, “[i]nconsistent anti-trafficking
statutes in a region result in human trafficking routes shifting as opposed to human
trafficking activity lessening.” Id. at 939 (emphasis added).
328. See Dysart, supra note 96, at 267 (“According to the United States Department
of State, the ‘protection’ prong [of the TVPA] ‘is key to the victim-centered approach the
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the harder it will be for victims to recover and the easier it will be
for the public to implicitly justify their criminalization.329
Although the victim-perpetrator dilemma can best be addressed
through the creation of a rebuttable presumption of coercion, this
single curative measure will not solve our nation’s human traffick-
ing problem.330 The presumption of coercion will, however, prevent
the creation of new sources of stress and trauma and ease the collat-
eral consequences of a criminal record, while still leaving room for
prosecutors to effectively curb crime in the interests of justice.331
Though survivors have experienced a tremendous amount of abuse,
many are resilient and so much more than their trafficking story;
they “are leaders, experts, advocates, caseworkers, lawyers, speakers,
consultants, program managers, and executive directors.”332 Survivors
are worthy of our effort, and in the pursuit of justice, states must
take preventative steps to better protect them—even those who at
first glance look like perpetrators.
United States and the international community pursues in efforts to combat modern
slavery.’ ”).
329. The moral stigma associated with the sexual promiscuity of prostitution is often im-
puted to human trafficking victims. See, e.g., Trafficking Survivor Cases, supra note 91.
330. See supra Section IV.A.
331. Id.
332. See Nat’l Survivor Network, Voices of the National Survival Network, https://free
domnetworkusa.org/app/uploads/2018/04/Voices-of-the-NSN-Report.pdf; see also Martina
E. Vandenberg, Innovations in the Fight Against Human Trafficking: Listening to Traffick-
ing Survivors, Fighting for Justice, 60 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 631, 632 (2015) (describing the
significant role of trafficking survivors in the anti-trafficking movement and how the
anti-trafficking community is shifting to become more survivor-led).
